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"Unfortunately,  efficiency is a fact  and justice a slogan"
Jacques Ellul,  The Technological Society,  1964, p.282 .
INTRODUCTION
This paper examines what happened to poverty and income inequality during the early
period of transition to market economy. It covers the period up to 1993, and includes almost all
transition economies that were not affected by wars, blockades or embargoes.  This is because
in the latter case the intrinsic issues of transition are overshadowed by more fundamental issues
of war or quasi war economy and survival. The two key issues of social policy in transition are
pension reform and better targeting of social assistance. Pension represent 70 to 80 percent of
cash  social expenditures.  No  reduction of  current  levels of  social spending  (which may be
unsustainable),  can be  envisaged without pension reform. Better targeting of social assistance
is  needed  because  many  universally  or  enterprise-provided  benefits  have  been terminated,
poverty has increased,  social programs  lack funding.  If poverty is on the rise and  money is
scarce, better targeting is the only option.
Section 1
THE  LEGACY  - AND WHERE  TO  GO?
Social insurance. The socialist system insured full employment in the state sector--thus
obviating the need for unemployment insurance.  The employees were paid relatively low net
wages with low returns  to education. Job security was guaranteed. Economic risk-taking was
discouraged. The environment was the one of very low risk in almost all spheres-except  when
failing to toe the political line.
High payroll taxes were used to finance pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions received by all
those  who  worked  in the  state  sector  (from  60-70 percent  of  all  employed  in  Poland  and
Yugoslavia where agriculture was mostly private to almost 100 percent in Czechoslovakia and
'I am grateful for many useful comments to Zsuzsa Ferge, Alan Gelb, Christiaan Grootaert, Janos Kornai, Martha de Melo,
Milic Milovanovic, Rita Purina,  Martin Rein, Michal Rutkowski and Martin Schrenk as well as to participants at seminars at
Harvard University, University of Maryland, World Bank, and Council of Europe where the paper was presented.  Yvonne Ying
and Nadia Soboleva provided valuable research assistance.2
the  USSR), as  well as  generous sickness and maternity allowances and  family benefits.
Pensionable  age was low, with many privileged  groups enjoying  even earlier retirement  rights.
Pensions were non-actuarial.  In Eastern Europe, average pension as a percentage of average
state-sector  wage tended  to be high (around  55-60 percent), while in the former Soviet Unions
it was rather low (around  40 percent).  2
The  role  of  enterprises.  A  number of  social functions devolved  to  enterprises.  The
enterprises  provided housing  for workers  and, in the Soviet  Union, they often  provided and paid
for workers' utilities (heating, hot water). Enterprises ran their own canteens, health facilities,
owned  vacation  houses  that provided  cheap holidays,  and subsidized  child care. Enterprises  were
often the conduits through which workers were supplied  with scarce products at low prices.
Although  enterprises in the West also fulfill  some  of these functions,  their importance  was much
greater in socialist  economies.  Not convenience,  but ideological  and political  reasons  explain  the
role played by the enterprises.
Ideologically, state sector was viewed as the backbone of socialist development.  In
consequence,  the "good citizen" of the socialist  commonwealth  was the one who worked in the
state sector. Toward him or  her were to  be directed all the  benefits. Hence the  role of
enterprises which, by definition,  insured perfect targeting  of benefits. The enterprises were not
regarded  as mere producers of goods or (less valued)  services,  but rather as places  where people
were brought  together  to participate  in the process of socialization  and creation  of a "new man".
Indeed, this original, naive, blueprint gradually faded; few of the new entrants in the labor
market in the late 1970s or 1980s  thought of the firms where they worked in such terms. Yet
the role of the enterprises continued to  reflect that initial ideological  bent, and cannot be,
probably, adequately  understood  without it. In words of Russian writer Alexander Zinoviev: "I
asked him [a Communist  ideologist]  how really important  was the Great Construction  Site [the
enterprise]. Were  the  victims justified? The  Construction Site-he  replied-was  without
importance, meaningless  from economic  as from any other practical standpoint.  But precisely
this was its great historical  meaning. This was, above everything  else, a form of organization
of human  life, and only after that, was this a phenomenon  of secondary  importance  in economics
and industry".'
In addition, anchoring social benefits in enterprises and linking them to working for a
monopoly  employer,  the state, ensured  political  obedience.  Those who did not want to work for
the state were treated as non-persons 4, left without  sustenance  for themselves  and their family.
Linking  benefits  to jobs and keeping money  wage distribution  relatively  egalitarian  had a further
objective: to prevent accumulation  of private wealth to which those who decided  to ignore (or
2Romania and Bulgaria are exceptions in Eastern Europe. Their  pension-wage ratios were similar to those in the Soviet
Union.
3Quoted from Serbo-Croatian translation of Nashey yunostii polet  [The elan of our youth], p.  145.
4See Mozny (1994, p.220).3
even worse, oppose) the state/party could resort. Many ministers realized precariousness of their
position when loss of job  entailed eviction from the house, end of a chauffeur-driven limo and
resumption of queuing for food.  On a less grand  scale, many workers became party members
and  attended endless  boring  meetings  in order  to qualify  for enterprise-provided  housing or
subsidized vacation.
Health  care and education.  Health care was almost entirely socialized and free (a few
countries had some private practice). It was financed from general revenues. The services were
widely available, particularly  when measured in terms of the usual indicators (doctors or beds
per  capita), but bad organization,  wrong incentives (e.g. to prolong the stay of the patients in
hospitals in order collect more money from the insurance), and demoralized personnel (doctors
were  uniformly  badly  paid)  made  services  to  be  of  low  quality  and  queuing  widespread.
Inadequate preventive care,  insufficient dissemination of information on healthy living etc. led
to  stagnation or even declines in life expectancy (in Romania and the USSR) even before the
onset of the GDP declines.
Education was also entirely socialized and practically free (there were small fees for some
university courses and textbooks). Private schools were not allowed. Only Church, as in Poland,
could run some limited educational facilities (unrelated to clergy). Measured in terms of standard
indicators, educational achievements were considerable even if below those of Western countries.
However,  the mismatch between the type of education produced and needs of modern economy
was great. Even those people who had skills needed in a  modem economy could not be used
efficiently by enterprises that remained  mired in the old ways of doing business. Low returns
to education further depressed any incentive to acquire and productively use the education.
Inequality  and povefy.  Socialist countries exhibited relatively low levels of inequality. 5
Measured  inequality  was,  on  average,  at  the  low  end  of  inequality  found  in  OECD
countries-comparable  to that  in Scandinavia.  Even if adjusted for  some flaws in  household
surveys from  which these data were derived 6 and for privileged consumption in kind enjoyed
by  the  elite,  inequality  still  remained  very  modest.7 Furthermore,  if  consumption  of  the
privileged were  to  be taken  into account,  other  subsidies-most  of them  for  food and other
essentials-should  be included as well. This would invariably reduce income inequality because
of low income elasticity of the most heavily subsidized goods. 8 Fragmentary  data on housing
5Except for the former Yugoslavia and China.  In case of Yugoslavia, higher inequality compared to other socialist economies
was due to wide inter-regional differences in average income.
6They include omission of  the very poor,  and the top  "nomenklatura",  creating the bias-particularly  present in Soviet
surveys-toward  the "average" income or consumption.
"Elite privileges were exaggerated both by the population (because of the secrecy in which privileges were held) and by too
credulous Western analysts.  In effect,  as anybody who has visited vacation homes previously kept strictly "off-limits" for all
but the top Party brass can testify,  their level of comfort and service is below an average Holiday Inn.
8For the results for Poland see World Bank (1989); for Hungary,  Kupa and Fajth (1990, p. 37); for Czechoslovakia, World
Bank (1991, p. 59). The most pro-poor were,  obviously,  food subsidies; the least, transportation and culture.4
subsidies  show,  in  contrast,  that  they  did  not  reduce  overall  inequality:  richer  households
received proportionately  more of the subsidy, and urban benefitted compared to the rural.
The  "really"  poor  were  relatively  few.  It  is  very  likely  that towards  the end  of the
Communist rule, their percentage was in single digit numbers (say, between 3 and 7 percent of
the population) with the possible exceptions of Albania, Romania (because of the harshness of
the last Ceausescu years) and the less developed parts of the Soviet Union.
Authorities' attitude toward the poor.  Social assistance was relegated to a subsidiary
role. Neither in terms of its size nor concentration on the poor did social assistance have the role
that it typically has in the West. In part it was due to the fact that poverty was not widespread
(at least in Eastern Europe and the European part of the USSR), and in part to the ideological
taboo that preferred  not to see poverty because in an ideal socialist system poverty would be
eliminated.  Specifically anti-poverty policy thus dealt only with  "excess"  cases of alcoholics,
handicapped, lone old-age people etc.,  was undertaken half-heartedly by local authorities or,  if
tolerated, by charitable organizations (e.g.  in countries where Church involvement, as in Poland
and Hungary,  was impossible to prevent).
There was little sympathy for the "socialist poor" as such.  Here  one must distinguish
between sympathy for the poor that were perceived to be the victims of the previous system (e.g.
rural illiterate and poor, unskilled urban workers etc.) and the lack of sympathy for the "socialist
poor" that is, people without steady jobs, vagrants, the handicapped. The poor from the previous
regimes were often helped by the Communists. During the first 10-15 years after the Communist
revolutions all  socialist countries achieved significant progress  in the eradication of diseases,
literacy and school enrollment, overall social mobility, that is in the indicators where the main
beneficiaries  were  precisely  the  underclass from  the previous  system.  Not  surprisingly,  the
"capitalist" poor,  who, under the new system, were given the chance to educate their children,
migrate to  cities,  or  make successful careers  in  state- or  Party-sponsored  institutions,  often
proved the strongest supporters of socialist regimes.
But, in regard to the "socialist poor" the authorities were generally cool and toward some
of them even inimical.  Not only did the existence of the poor make mockery of the regime's
claim that poverty is a capitalist phenomenon, Communist ideologues genuinely regarded such
people  as  aberrations.  They  argued  that  if  everyone  was  guaranteed  free  schooling, to  be
followed by a steady state job  and all the benefits that go with  it, if everyone could avail of
generous family allowances, and, after retiring, could enjoy adequate pension, then the fault for
being poor lied with these people and not the system. Poverty  was not only viewed as social
pathology and an implicit denial of the "perfectness" of the system but -not  unlike in Calvinist
ethics and the recent backlash against unwed mothers in the USA-  rather sinisterly, as an5
explicit anti-social choice by the poor ("the poor do not want to work" hence "they do not want
to  contribute  to  the  building  of  the  new  society"  hence  "they  are  anti-social  elements,
parasites").'  Communist view was not unreasonable:  if perfect  society is here, and  its virtues
are  self-evident, only the ill-disposed and  wicked people can refuse to participate  in such an
endeavor.  Communist  authorities  therefore  evinced  little  sympathy  for  some  poor;  they
encouraged the stigma in which other citizens anyway tended to hold them.  And, to make the
plight of the poor worse, Communist authorities discouraged non-government organizations, in
particular the Church, to help them, because they distrusted all non-governmental initiatives and
viewed them as a politically motivated ploys to acquire influence by helping the disenfranchised.
The  negative  attitude  toward  the  poor  had  several  practical  consequences.  Social
assistance  systems were  rather  rudimentary:'0 practices  differed  from  one  social assistance
office to the next; little effort was made to improve income-testing, on which, at least in theory,
some of the benefits depended;  social workers were  few in numbers,  demoralized  and badly
paid. The authorities thus lacked experience in identifying the needy and in delivering social aid.
The "social minimum" lines were defined mostly by the "armchair" economists and nutritionists
and were unrelated to any social policy."  They were "socially desirable"  levels of consumption
-kind  of "how people should be living under Communism"-  and were targets rather than any
realistic,  much less guaranteed,  minimums. In conclusion,  anti-poverty policy was haphazard
and not at all integrated into the overall economic and social policy: it was viewed as a "foreign
body" in an otherwise perfect system.'2
Finally,  in a personal observation,  rereading  some of the papers and books published
before the end of Communism, and quite obviously written by Party hacks, I was struck by two
things: first,  self-congratulory description of the size of social spending-clearly  viewed as one
9Carr (1966, p.1 14) quotes Lenin's article from January 1918 where he writes that  "he that does not work,  neither shall he
eat"  as  "the  practical  credo  of  socialism".  Workers  who  "slack  at  their  work"  were  included  among  the  categories  of
misdemeanants "who deserved to be put in pnson".
"Although this was not true for all the countries: fonmer Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, as well as Hungary had relatively
well-developed systems. For an excellent review of poverty measurement and social assistance policies before the transition see
Sipos (1992) and Sipos (1994).
"Although  there too,  like in some other areas (macroeconomics and growth), the Soviet Union was among the pioneers.
The first workers'  social minima were calculated in 1921 in the then Soviet Russia (see Sipos, 1992a); after the Second World
War,  the first Soviet annual household budget survey dates from  1951 and has continued uninterrupted since.  By contrast, the
first regular annual US household survey was done in 1979. The Soviet data were of the panel type. Because the survey results
were secret, they were never disseminated and very little work was done on the data. Most of the data are still existent (although
in non-electronic form) and probably represent a golden mine for some future student of economic history of the Soviet Union.
'2A Hungarian commentator noted in the midst of the perestroika in 1988: "Institutional assistance for the poor has still not
been put on the public agenda in the Soviet Union. After all, the fact that a substantial portion of the citizens live under seriously
deprived conditions remains to this day a taboo topic. In a country where until very recently it had not been acknowledged that
there were drug addicts and homosexuals, and where it was forbidden to entertain the possibility that anybody could be unhappy,
it is hardly surprising that official policy makers were reluctant to take note of poverty" (quoted from Hollander,  1991, p.  15).6
of accomplishments  of socialism-  without  any discussion  of its costs or possible  negative
incentive  effects; and, second, great reticence  toward discussion  of poverty, sometimes  omitted
altogether.
Changes in  the economy. Transition brought about many important and sometimes
dramatic changes in the picture sketched above. The key policy changes that affected the
population  were two kinds of elimination  of subsidies:  enterprise and product subsidies.  An end
to open-ended  subsidization  of enterprises  (i.e. to the notorious "soft-budget  constraint")  meant
an end to life-long  guaranteed  employment  and to unlimited  demand  for labor. Unemployment
appeared. Elimination  of most product  subsidies  (housing  and energy  are still  subsidized  in a few
countries)' 3 meant that the  relative price of the essentials increased, thus putting a  further
squeeze on the poor.' 4 On the positive side, though,  the elimination  of product subsidies  meant
the queuing disappeared  while quality and variety of goods improved. The people with higher
opportunity  cost of time who are normally better-off  benefitted  more than the poor, however." 5
Main directions of  change in social policy.  The change of the social insurance and
assistance  systems  is the joint outcome  of the starting  point (the system  as it was) and ideological
views regarding the "desired" system toward which the fornerly  socialist countries want to
evolve.
The change is easiest in the areas where both financial  and ideological  considerations
combine  to make the maintenance  of the previous  arrangement  impossible.  This is the case with
the heavy involvement of enterprises in  social policy. Facing harder budget constraint and
elimination  of tax benefits  that favored "collective  consumption",  that is fringe benefits, rather
than cash wages, enterprises tend to shed these functions." 6 They cease to subsidize  canteens,
sell vacation  homes  or charge market prices, reduce  the access  to free child care. Ideologically,
they are also pushed in that direction because their new role is,  like in  capitalism, to be
producers of goods and services-not  appendages  of the state protection system.
This does not go without  problems  though. The heavily subsidized  functions  either need
to be discontinued  to the great dismay  of their users (e.g. employed  mothers who  lose affordable
child care) or subsidies  have to be taken over by somebody  else. That "somebody  else" should
most often be local government. But as local governments are strapped for cash, they are
3Explicit  (paid-out) consumer subsidies decreased from between 5 and 7 percent of GDP to less than 1 percent of GDP (see
Milanovic, 1994, p.  195).
' 4Rising relative price of the essentials is reflected in cost-of-living indexes rising faster than  broader  indexes like GDP
deflators  or  wholesale prices.  Thus  in Bulgaria, CPI  inflation rate  in 1992 and  1993 was one-a-and-a-half times the  GDP
deflator; in Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia 1.2 times. Only in slow reformers, where consumer prices were not
liberalized,  did CPI indices rise slower than the GDP deflator (Belarus until  1994, and Central  Asian countries).
" 5For an empirical estimate of the gain brought about by the elimination of queuing in Poland and Russia see Roberts (1993).
'
61t was a common practice in socialism, continued nowadays in China,  not to tax "collective consumption" but to heavily
tax wages.  Enterprises thus found it convenient to pay a part of wages in kind (through goods like meat, sugar,  cooking oil).7
reluctant to take over these functions: a game  "hot potato"  where each  side tries to push the
responsibility onto somebody else ensues between enterprises, local governments and the center.
A particular problem in the FSU countries are utilities (district gas and heating) that were
built  and  maintained  by  enterprises.  Utilities'  consumption  was either  entirely  paid  for  by
enterprises or households were charged a fee reflecting apartment space or number of household
members.  Meters  to  measure  individual consumption did  not exist.  As enterprises  cease to
subsidize utilities, huge arrears to power companies build. Local governments cannot pay them,
while making consumers more responsible, and charging them for what they actually consume,
requires additional investments (metering the consumption and sometimes changing the whole
set-up of the system)." 7
Most economists also agree that sickness benefits,  maternity leave and possibly family
allowances need to be  made more restrictive.'8 For example,  sickness allowance may have to
be paid, for the early part of the sick leave, by enterprises rather than by social insurance funds.
This should cut on the abuse as more cost-conscious enterprises try to control expenditures. The
duration of  over-generous  maternity leave  may be reduced.  Family  allowances  may become
income-tested.
All countries have allowed private health care.  Little of the necessary restructuring  in
insurance (e.g.  100% of private health costs is paid by the users), has accompanied the reform.
The change is much more difficult in the area of pensions because it directly affects the
acquired rights of a large segment of the population and because the exact direction of change
is not clear. Pension schemes have come under pressure everywhere, due to aging populations,
sometimes massive early retirement in anticipation of privatization-related lay-offs, and reduced
tax base, both because of GDP declines and worsening tax collection from the private  sector.
Only a few countries have proceeded to modest changes in the pension system. Estonia,
Latvia,  Romania and  Slovenia have started to  gradually  increase the  retirement  age.  Others
(Hungary) have legislated that such increases would begin in the future. Administratively simple
benefit schemes,  resulting in practically equal pensions for  all,  have been introduced in  two
Baltic countries.  Attempts have been made to protect the minimum pension  levels to mitigate
poverty among the elderly, frequently relating the minimum pension to the subsistence minimum.
'"For example, if consumption is to be metered, households must be able to adjust their heating.  Under the current  system,
this is impossible. Thus introduction of metering also requires a change in the set-up of the system.
" 8 'n  the political arena the agreement on these benefits is elusive. Christian democratic parties are strongly pro-family and
thus in favor of generous maternity leave and family allowances; nationalist parties are pro-natalist and thus again in favor of
high family allowances; social democratic parties wish to protect sickness benefits.8
The desired  direction  of change  in the pension  system is not clear either. There are those
who believe that, once the reforms described in the previous paragraph are introduced, the
system's main characteristics  should no longer be changed-that  is, the system should remain
PAYG, state-run  and state-mandated  with only a limited role for private pension  schemes, and
with some  (albeit smaller  than in the past) redistribution.  The proponents  of this option  point out
that the reformed system would be the same as the existing West European pension systems.
Historical  factors are also present: the population  and the governments  have  had experience  with
PAYG systems  only (e.g. Hungary has had a PAYG system since 1927).
A different view is that the pension system should be fundamentally  overhauled, by
moving to a system where most of the old-age insurance is provided by private, fully-funded
pension  schemes  with full correspondence  between  individual  contributions  and pensions.  Despite
some  sizeable  initial  costs that the move to such  a system  would  entail (for a generation,  workers
would need to keep on paying  both for the existing  pensioners  and to build  their own funds), the
proponents  of this options argue that the current PAYG  system  are unsustainable  in the long-run
as the adverse demographic  transition sets in. They also point out to several countries (Chile,
Switzerland,  Australia)  that have recently  introduced  similar systems.
The exact shape of new instruments  of social protection,  like unemployment  benefits  and
social assistance  is even more debated. The introduction  of unemployment  benefits raised some
of the difficult questions  having to do with the interaction  between social insurance  and social
assistance. The problem was whether unemployment  benefits, fixed after some period of
unemployment  (9 to  12 months) at the subsistence level, should be used in  lieu of  social
assistance. The idea was appealing because it would dispense with the need to introduce yet
another new scheme (income-tested  social assistance). The drawback, however, was that the
unemployed  and the poor were not necessarily  the same overlapping  groups and many people
who were out of the labor force rushed to have themselves  registered  as unemployed.  The idea
of open-ended unemployment  benefits was soon abandoned, and replaced everywhere with
benefits whose duration was limited to one year or less.
As for social  assistance, the logical  approach, at the beginning  of the transition,  seemed
to introduce  income-tested  social assistance, and, in some countries,  even the minimum  income
that would  be guaranteed  to all. This was in keeping  with the prevalent  West European  practice.
The transition  economies  that aspired to become  more like OECD economies  appeared poised
to move in that direction. Also, chronologically  the transition started in Poland and Hungary
whose level of development, relative administrative  sophistication,  and the existing taxation
systems were much closer to the West European than, for example, those of the Central Asian
republics. However, financial non-feasibility  of guaranteed minimum  income, a concept that
France managed to introduce only in 1988 and which Italy or Spain still do not have, soon
became clear. The plans for its introduction  were shelved  everywhere, either officially or de
facto. No transition economy is currently financially  able to explicitly undertake to guarantee
to all its citizens  a decent minimum  income.  On the other hand, income  testing, as a mechanism
to screen the increasing  pool of applicants  for social  assistance  (i.e. to decide whom  to help and9
whom not), is  working, however haphazardly, using the  existing infrastructure of  social
assistance  offices  and personnel. The funds, numbers of recipients,  and even more, the number
of applicants  for social assistance have all increased since the transition. The importance  of
social  assistance  has also increased-not least because  it is viewed  as critically  important  for the
survival of reforms and good political  fortune of the current governments.
Section  2
WHAT  HAS ACTUALLY HAPPENED  --  SEVEN STYLIZED  FACTS"'
Five years into the transition is a period long enough to allow us to draw "a stylized
picture"  of what the transition  has meant in the social sphere. I will deal primarily  with the costs
of the transition. Many of its benefits, not only higher incomes for some, but the increase in
freedom, will not be dealt here. But, clearly, the benefits should not be forgotten.
Fact 1. Higher social costs than expected.
When socialism collapsed, no one knew what exactly to expect. During the earlier,
reverse transition, from capitalism to  socialism, many Communists and socialists used to
complain  that they had little to go by in terms of theory. They  lamented  the fact that Marx-who
did not like to  write,  as  he put it,  "the cookbooks for the  future"-discussed  with  such
parsimoniousness  how socialism would look. But Communists  at least had some idea how to
proceed: nationalization  of key industries, "mobilization"  of labor, social equality, labor as the
key (only?)  source of income  etc. But how to move from socialism  to capitalism,  no one knew.
For socialists,  it was unthinkable.  Advocates  of capitalism  likewise  never put down clearly  what
should  be done: did they too believe it was far-fetched?
When  the transition  began, populations,  governments,  and international  organization  had
a much more optimistic  view of the likely social costs than shown by the subsequent  events. 20
Indeed, everybody  expected some unemployment  but nobody expected such massive drops in
output and incomes:  the drops that in many countries  dwarf even the loss of output during the
Great Depression  in the US and Germany, the two then most affected countries. The rationale
for this relative optimism was that state ownership was such an inefficient system so that
redeployment  of labor and capital could not but have immediate  positive effects. The less
efficient socialism  was, the greater was thought to be the gain from the "regime switch". And
quite possibly this might still be the case. But not in the short-run.
The reflection  of this optimism  can be seen in governments'  own projections  as well as
'9A more detailed analysis of the results in section can be found in Milanovic, Income, Inequality and Poverty during the
Transition, forthcoming.
20Gomulka (1995, p.329)  lists over-optimism as the first among the major errors  in assumptions and policies during the
transition.10
in those of international organizations.  They consistently underestimated the actual declines in
GDP (Table 1). Of course,  some of the discrepancy between the expectations and outcomes may
be explained by political developments that few could predict.  The collapse of the Soviet Union
and the breakdown of the CMEA severely disrupted trade flows and led to large short-run output
declines.21
Fact 2. Emergence  of unemployment and increased poverty.
Higher  social costs are reflected in two things: unemployment and increase in poverty.
Indeed the two go to some extent together. The linkage between unemployment and poverty is
stronger in countries where unemployment rates are high, and where,  even more importantly,
the share of the long-term unemployed (those unemployed for more than a year) is greater. This
is because unemployment benefits usually run for one year, 22 and those who are unemployed
for  longer either  lose the eligibility altogether or  receive only a  fraction of earlier benefits. 23
In  Poland  in  1993,  for  example,  poverty  of  36  percent  of  the  poor  could  be  related  to
unemployment. Poverty of half of those 36 percent was due to long-term unemployment.
21According  to some estimates,  up to a third of the output decline in the FSU may be attributable to trade disruption.  For
Eastern Europe, the estimates range from 8.5 percent of GDP for Czechoslovakia to 6.3 percent for Poland (see Rosati, 1993).
'in  some countries (the Baltics) for even less-6  months; in Armenia, 3 months only. In Ukraine, unemployment benefits
are (in 1995) to be cut from 3 months to 1.
'in  Romania, for example,  the long-term unemployed receive,  at best,  only an income support equal to about 11 percent
of the average wage,  while the minimum unemployment benefit is about 25 percent of the average wage (see Subbarao and
Mehra,  1995, p3). In Poland, (flat) unemployment benefits are 35 percent of the average wage; the maximum amount of social
assistance is  28 percent of  the average wage. Even  in Russia where the position of the unemployed is notoriously bad, an
unemployed  worker  who  was earning  average wage  before being laid  off  will  receive more  during  the  15 months while
unemployment benefits last than after provided rate of inflation remains less than about 400 percent per year.  (This is because
unemployment benefits are normally unindexed.  Social assistance after expiry of the benefits is equal to the minimum wage
which is, in the second half of  1994, was about 8 percent of the average wage.  Calculated from Layard (1994, p.102).11
Table 1
Projected and actual GDP growth rates
Years  Poland  Hungary  Soviet Union  Czechoslovakia  Bulgaria
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~~~~Russia_  _  I  __  _  _  __
Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual  Projected  Actual
1990  -5.0  -11.9  -1.9  -4.0
1991  3.0  -8.0  -3.0  -7.5  -5  -16  -11  -23
1992  -15  -18.4
1993  -5  -12  _
1994  -8  -15  =
Note: In all cases,  projection are government projections most often agreed with IMF and the World Bank.
Sources:  For Hungary and Poland,  Commander and Corricelli (1993, pp.  174-5); for Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria,  Bruno
(1993, p.20).  For Russia, Birzehevniye Vedomosti, 7 December  1994.12
Specific  poverty  rates  are  also  higher  in  households  affected  by  unemployment.  In
Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary, the poverty rates for the households where at least one member
is unemployed,  are between 21/2  and 4 times higher than the country average.  In Poland,  for
which we have very detailed data for 1993, one can observe the increase in poverty incidence
as unemployment becomes more severe: households with one unemployed member who is not
the head of the household had poverty rates twice the average; for households with a long-term
unemployed, the  incidence is 2.6  times higher than the average;  for  households with two  or
more  unemployed  members,  it  is  3.3  times  higher,  and  for  households  headed  by  an
unemployed person  4 times.'  We can expect that even if unemployment no longer rises,  the
share of the long-term unemployed will, and the linkage between unemployment and poverty
would grow stronger.
But, while unemployment is an important cause of poverty, it is not the most important.
Most of the poor-maybe  as many as Vs-are  the working poor.  The poverty of these families
is due to low-paying jobs held by their active members. And, indeed, it would be surprising if
the working poor (including their children) were not the main category of the poor. Since drops
in real GDP which ranged between 10 and 50 percent (excluding the countries at wars; see Table
2) did not lead to equivalent decreases  in employment, output-per-person  and real wages for
many of those who remained employed plummeted. 25
By how much has poverty increased? Measures of poverty are notoriously unreliable and
difficult to interpret. They depend not only on how frank people are in reporting their incomes
(or expenditures),  but  also  how good  the  statistical  offices are  in  collecting  the  data  (how
representative are the surveys) and what is the poverty line used. Yet,  one could make a fairly
strong proposition that for any real poverty line, we are bound to find an increase in poverty
in all the transition economies. 26
The  recorded increase  is,  probably,  greater  than the actual increase.  This  is because
before the transition,  the estimates of the poverty rates were biased downwards,  while today,
they are biased upwards. Downward bias before the transition was because the surveys excluded
people from the groups that were likely to  be poor (institutionalized population,  vagrants, the
few unemployed), or underrepresented the groups with higher specific poverty rates (pensioners,
farmers, large households, students). Income data, on the other hand, were relatively reliable.
Today, the situation is reversed. The surveys are improving, bringing in some of the previously
" 4See World Bank, Poverty in Poland, vol.  1, Table 2.23, page 35.
25Hidden  unemployment is the most obvious  effect of  the mismatch between (larger)  output and (smaller)  employment
declines.  Many jobs are low-paying because they are redundant.  In the FSU countries,  in particular,  both the government, in
order to stem further increases in unemployment, and enterprises,  in order to let workers continue enjoying some non-cash
benefits  associated with jobs,  prefer  to  let redundant workers  stay  on the  payroil  even if  they do  no work  and are paid
irregularly.
26This excludes "unreasonably" low or high poverty lines for which poverty may be unchanged at 0 or close to 100 percent.13
unreported poor, while incomes are highly underreported. 27 Thus, somewhat  ironically, both
an  improvement (better  surveys)  and  a  deterioration in  statistical practices  (greater
underreporting)  combine to push the poverty rates up.
However, even after  some adjustments are  made, e.g.  "blowing up" the  reported
household  incomes by the macro data (whose  downward  bias is less), or by using expenditures
rather than incomes-the poverty rates in 1993-94  are higher than they were before the transition
for all the countries.
Table 2 shows  poverty estimates  using a single poverty line ($ 120  per capita per month
at 1990 international  prices). 28 By using the same line, we can compare poverty in a given
country through time, and poverty between the countries. This poverty line is 4 times higher
than the World Bank absolute poverty line. It is, however, only ½/2  of the US and Germany's
poverty lines. 29 For  all  the transition economies as  a  whole, the poverty headcount has
increased  from about 4 percent or 15 million  people to (conservatively  estimated)  about a third
of the population  or more than 100  million  people. The latter figure excludes  the Central Asian
countries  whose data are more dubious.  If we "guessestimate"  their poverty, total number  of the
poor may exceed 125 million. Almost 90 million of them live in the Slavic republics of the
FSU-with  64 million in Russia alone.
The percentage  of the poor increased  from 5 to 23 in the Balkans  and Poland, and from
1/2  to  1 in Central Europe (the Czech and Slovak republics, Slovenia and Hungary). Small
increase  in poverty  in Central Europe is due to the fact that the common  poverty line ($PPP 120)
is low relative  to these countries' average incomes both in 1987-88  and in 1992-93. Very few
people had income below that level, in either year. The Baltic countries started the transition
with very low poverty rates, close to  those of Central European countries. Their poverty
recorded  sharp increases affecting  over a third of the population. In the Slavic  republics  of the
former  USSR and Moldova, the poverty rates increased  even more than in the Baltics. Russia's
poverty headcount is estimated to  have risen from 2 percent to  about 43 percent of  the
population; Ukraine's from 2 to 41 percent. Finally, the Central Asian countries began the
transition with relatively  high poverty headcounts  (in double digits except in Kazakhstan).  The
recent data for these republics show that poverty, as defined here, affects almost ½/2  of their
population.
27In the past, declared earnings were typically checked with enterprises, and pensions with post offices.  None of that is done
any longer, and a greater share of overall income is composed of sources that are intrinsically more difficult to verify.
28Purchasing  power of domestic currencies for  1990 is obtained from the latest round of International Comparison Project
(lCP).  $120 are multiplied by the 1990 local currency (LC) purchasing power to obtain the LC equivalent of the $120 poverty
line in 1990. This amount is then inflated by the country's  cost of living index to get the poverty line expressed in LC in the
ensuing years.
2$PPP  120 is below the so-called social minima used in Eastern Europe which range between 150 and 250 international
dollars per  month per  capita.  It is only slightly higher than the  'austere"  Russian Ministry of Labor subsistence minimum in
existence since November 1992. The Ministry of Labor minimum is, in turn,  less than 3/5 of the old Soviet social minimum.14
Table  2
Estmated  Gini coeffidents  and  poverty  headcounts  in transition  economies
Country  Real GDP decline  |  Gini coefficient  Poverty headcount (in percent)
_________________  I  (annual)  I _  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
1993  wrt 1987  1987-8  1993-94  1987-88  1993-94
Poland  -10  26  31a  6  20.
Bulgaria  -25  23b  31c  2b  17&,c
Romania  -33  23b  33.  6b  32.
| iHungary  -15  23b  28  <lb  2
Czech rep  19  19  27  0  < I
Slovakia  -21  20  20c  0  4c
Slovenia  -22  24  29  0  0
Lithuzaani  -21  26  35  1297
Lturke  46  31271
Eston.ia  +33  66  . ....  . . . .
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~...  ................  .......,  ..'..''  :'  .'."''  : ':'-'.  .... ...- 
'  .........  -. '. ....  .....eL  h  .7
Brazakhl  a  -0  264  335
iThur  enista.  -14  23  37  12  49
Uzbekisan  04  23  273  24  29
Malaysia  +3  23  4015I33,
Ndee:  Thle  poventy hadoosat  as.  *peeces  . of  ....  poan....  asaed  . . the  po.esty  hine$120 per mosth  per cyih.. d.  1990 i.se..  nsi.. l  prnces.  Re..os. me  a
for  Oluls asa powis  *is  re  mwiglaed  avegeqe; regiosal  poverty rareae  pqoputio-wesged  averages.  Macro  incomes  sed  to  *bIowv  up HBS inicomes wbsenever  HIBS dda
aserpr  mcofmc reldieve to  macro  d  t  souce  Cosaiie'  h  osmehod  bulet  asaeys  For ddails  see Milanovic  (1995.  forthcoing).15
How  much would be  needed in current  dollar  terms,  assuming perfect  targeting, 30 to
eradicate poverty in transition economies? The annual total is estimated at some $10.2 billion.3'
Around  3h  is  needed for  the  Slavic republics  of  the FSU  and  Moldova,  with  Russia alone
accounting for the lion's  share ($6.4 billion per year). The Balkans and Poland would need some
$2.5  billion.  The requirements of the other two regions,  the Baltics and Central  Europe,  are
small,  amounting  to  some  $300 million per  year for  both  combined.  In  the  case of  Baltic
countries, this is because the population is small even if the headcount ratios are high (the total
Baltic population  is  less than  that of  Bulgaria).  For  the Central  European  countries,  this  is
because the poverty rates are low.
The poverty deficit is estimated at 2.4 percent of the countries'  aggregated GDP.  The
poverty  deficit as a percentage  of GDP varies widely among the regions.  It is very  small in
Central  European  countries:  only about 0.1 percent  of  GDP. In  the Balkans and Poland,  the
poverty deficit is 1.6 percent of GDP. In the Baltics, the poverty deficit is 3.7 percent of GDP.
In Russia and the rest of Slavic republics and Moldova, it is 41/2  percent of GDP. These figures
may be contrasted with the poverty deficits of 3.8 percent of GDP for Turkey, 4.4 percent for
Brazil and 5.4  for Colombia  (all in the late  1980's and using the same poverty line of $PPP
120).
However, these amounts are based on the unrealistic assumption of perfect targeting. If
transition  economies were as efficient in poverty alleviation as Western economies,  the actual
costs  would  be  about  twice  as  high  ("the  gross-up"  factor)  as  the  costs  estimated  on  the
assumption of perfect targeting. 32 But they are probably less efficient. This is because of lower
administrative efficiency and because more people are likely to be potential claimants. And when
the numbers of the people near the poverty line increase, the probability of errors  in targeting
rises as well. In Poland,  a country with  a reasonably developed social assistance system, the
"gross up" factor in  1993 was 2.4.  For other countries, this  factor could easily be around  3,
implying that the overall cost  of poverty  alleviation may be  close to $30 billion per  year or
between 7 and 8 percent of the countries'  combined GDP. This is about as much as what they
spend on health and education together. 33
30Perfect targeting means that transfers are received only by the poor and in just the amounts required to bring them up to
the poverty line.
3'This  excludes  the  countries  at  war  or  various  blockades  (all  of  the  former  Yugoslavia except  Slovenia,  and  the
Transcaucasian countries) and the countries for which the 1993 data are not very reliable (Central Asia and Albania).
32See Sarah Mitchell (1991, p.82)  where the gross-up factor for all cash transfers (including social security) ranges from
4 for Sweden to 2 for  Australia. Since most of Australia's transfers are income- or means-tested transfers,  2 can be taken as
the gross-up factor specifically for poverty-related transfers.
3  Note, as a matter of comparison, that all US anti-poverty spending is about $160 billion per year, that is about five times
higher than the estimated poverty gap, inclusive of  "leakages", in Eastern Europe and European part of the FSU.16
Fact 3. Decline of average income and increased  inequality.
What may be called "the dynamics  of the descent in poverty" involves two movements:
an across-the-board  decline in real income and "stretching  out" of income distribution. Both
contribute  to the increase  in the numbers of the poor. The income and distribution  effects are
roughly  equal: each is responsible  for about l/2  of the increase in poverty.
As income declines, the income distribution curve slides leftward and, for a given
poverty line (z in Figure 1) more people become poor. But also for each given decline in
income, the numbers of those who "descend" into poverty increase. This happens because we
gradually move toward the "thicker" part of the income distribution  curve where most of the
population is located. To put it in a slightly technical jargon, the elasticity of poverty with
respect to  income declines. Empirical results show that for poorer countries, the Balkans,
Poland, and all of the FSU, the elasticity  is about  0.5, meaning  that each one percent across-the-
board decrease in income leads to a 0.5 percentage point increase in the poverty headcount.
What does it mean in actual numbers for, say, Russia? Each 10 percent income decline will
make an additional  5 percent of the population,  or about 7 million  people, poor. These are high
elasticities, the outcome of relatively compressed  income distribution  in the formerly socialist
economies.
Figure 1
Income distribution  curve (lognormal  density  function)
frequency
z  ~~~income
Note:  z=poverty  line.
A growing incormie  differentiation  also added to poverty. Income  distribution  has become
more unequal in a specific way. There is bunching (entassment) of the distribution at low income
levels, around the poverty line, while at  high income levels, the distribution has become
stretched out ("thinner"). Broadly speaking, the "winners" at the top (private entrepreneurs,
professionals)  have pulled far ahead of the rest of the population. The socialist  middle classes
(clerical  staff,  production  workers, teachers,  administrators,  doctors)  have  all slided  downwards,
and since  the losses  were greater for the better-off  among  them, income distribution  has become17
"bunched"  around the poverty line.3  On average,  income inequality has increased by around
5 to 6 Gini points.  The increases seem to have been the largest in the Baltics (which strongly
contributed to the rise in poverty), followed by Russia, Bulgaria, Czech republic,  and Poland.
What does a 5 to  6 points  increase in the Gini coefficient-from  about 24 in  1987 to
about 30 in  1993-mean  in practical terms? Two comparisons can be useful. First,  this amount
of increase is about one-half of that which occurred in the UK over the 10 years of the Thatcher
rule. 35 In  Eastern Europe  and the FSU,  however,  the change was compressed within 4  to 5
years, so the intensity of change was about the same. But, in addition,  in transition economies,
increasing inequality took place against the background of shrinking overall income. Second, a
Gini coefficient of about 30 for transition  economies as a whole means that they now have an
income inequality close to that of medium- to high-inequality OECD countries. 36
We can break-down the increase in the number of the poor between the effects of lower
incomes,  more  unequal  distribution,  and  demography.  Demography  too  can  add  up  to  the
number of the poor even if the poverty rates are constant. 37 The results,  however,  show that
the demographic effects are negligible. Out of the total (conservatively estimated) 57 million new
poor  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  European  part  of  the  FSU,  demographic  changes  were
responsible for only  1.2 million. This is not surprising since population growth rates in almost
all the countries were very low or even negative. Distributional changes brought in poverty for
29  million people,  19 million of  whom live  in Russia  and 4  million in Poland.  Decreasing
incomes alone "pushed" into poverty 27 million people, 8.5 million of whom live in Russia, and
10 million in Ukraine and Belarus.
Fact  4. Private  sector drives inequality up.
The driving force behind the increase in  inequality appears to  be substantially higher
earnings  of  the  skilled white-collar  workers  and  private  sector people  (including  the  self-
employed) and a growing share of private sector income. 38 Earnings inequality has risen almost
everywhere. We have unambiguous data to show that for Poland, the Czech republic,  Slovakia,
3 4Kolosi and  Robert (1993, p.34)  thus describe the situation in Hungary: "...[incomel  differentiation  [was such that] the
highest income groups exceeded the average income levels more than they did two years earlier, while the deviation of the lowest
income decile from the average did not come about. Meanwhile, the income position of the middle strata.. .strongly deteriorated".
35See  Johnson and Webb (1993).
"UK,  Australia,  Italy,  France,  Canada  have  Ginis  of  around  30.  US,  Switzerland,  and  Ireland  are  more  unequal;
Scandinavian countries,  Benelux, Western Germany are more equal. See Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1994, Figure 2).
"Simple growth of the population with the poverty rate constant, will increase the number of the poor.
" 8Of course, unfavorable distributional changes at low income level are also responsible for increased inequality (as witnessed
by their sizeable contribution to increased poverty).  But, it seems that even more important distributional changes took place
at the top of income distribution.18
Slovenia,  Bulgaria and Russia. 39 The second "contributor"  to increasing  inequality is a rising
share of private sector income which is,  of all broad income categories like wages, social
transfers  etc., the most unequally  distributed. A very vivid, almost textbook, illustration  of the
trend is provided  by the Bulgarian  data. Inequality  of private sector income, already higher than
that of other sources (see Figure 2) shoots up at the same time as its share in total income rises
(Figure 3). The importance  of wages (most of them still derived from the state and semi-state
sectors) declines, and targeting of social transfers does not change.
Social transfers have failed to mitigate the increase in inequality. As in the past, the
concentration  coefficient  of cash social transfers has remained  close to zero. 40 This means that
the correlation  between the level of income and the level of social transfers received, which is
expected  to be negative, is not statistically  significantly  different  from zero. This is in contrast,
to use again the UK as an example,  to the situation  during  the Thatcher era when declining  cash
social  transfers  were accompanied  by better targeting.  Between  1979  and 1989, the share of cash
transfers in disposable income of  the British population declined from  17 to  13 percent;
meanwhile,  the concentration  coefficient  of transfers moved  from -18 to -32 (the larger absolute
value indicates a sharper focus on the poor).4"
3 9For Poland,  see World Bank (1  994); for  Slovenia, Vodopivec and Orazem (1994); for the Czech and Slovak republics,
Vecernik (1994) and Chase (1995); for eastern Germany,  Bird, Schwarze and Wagner (1992).
4 0The concentration coefficient provides an index of transfer progressivity.  It indicates how much of the transfer is captured
by poorer  households  compared  to the  better-off.  If  all benefits are  received  by the poorest  individual,  the  concentration
coefficient would be -100; if everybody receives the same amount regardless of income, the coefficient is 0; if all benefits accrue
to the richest person,  the coefficient is + 100.
41See Milanovic (1994, p.  190).19
Figure  2  Figure  3
Bulgaria:  Concentration  coefficients  of  Bulgaria:  composition  of disposable
various  sources  of income  income  (in percent)






;  ';'  ~~~---  tI.*r!-i-O
19)  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1901  988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Note:  More  unequally  distributed  income  source
has a higher  coefficient.  The concentration
coefficient  also shows  how much  a given  source
"pushes"  up the overall  inequality.
Figure  4
Percentage  of a transfer  received  by three  lowest deciles
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It is also in strong contrast to Chile, where social transfers are extremely well targeted.
For example, almost 1/2  of the benefits from public works and unemployment insurance in Chile
accrue  to the lowest income decile and  3h to the bottom three deciles.  In  the UK,  about 80
percent of benefits from social assistance ("income support") is paid to the bottom three deciles
(Figure 4). In Poland,  on the other hand, the bottom three deciles receive less than 60 percent
of  social  assistance  and  unemployment  benefits,  and  in  Bulgaria,  only  40  percent  of
unemployment benefits. In Romania and Russia, social assistance accurues proportionately more
to the rich than to the poor. 42
Fact 5. The "winners": the educated, private sector.
The "winners" in the transition are skilled white-collar workers, private entrepreneurs,
city people,  and  (less certainly)  women. An explanation for improved position of  the skilled
white-collar workers is increased demand for many "new" skills: for computer specialists, people
with knowledge of foreign languages, accountants, bankers,  even economists, the usual service
sector people who do well in Western economies. This increased demand is a reflection of the
rising share of the almost entirely private service sector in the GDP. 43
Returns to education have also risen. Vecernik (1994a) calculates for the Czech republic
that the rate of return to one additional year of education has, on average,  risen from 3.5 percent
to 6.2 percent.  Comparing Czech and Slovak earmings distributions for  1984 and 1993, Chase
(1995) finds the increase in the rate of return to education to have been between 2 and 3 percent.
World Bank (1994, p.  93) report on Poland finds the increase to be from 6.4 percent  in  1989
to  7.5 percent  in  1992. As for  returns to  experience,  one would expect  that they decline as
experience acquired under the previous regime becomes of less value in new market conditions.
Indeed this  is what  the  studies  find  in  eastern  Germany,  Poland,  the  Czech Republic,  and
Slovakia. Only in  Slovenia,  returns  to experience  have increased.'  The results  for  Slovenia
may be due to the less dramatic system change in that country (Slovenian enterprises were much
more independent from  the state than their counterparts  in Czechoslovakia or Poland) and to
some  possible  endogeneity  in  the  results:  it  seems  that  wages  of  the  older  workers  were
deliberately raised in order to increase their pension base and allow them to retire early at rather
comfortable pensions. 45
42For Russia, see World Bank (1995, p. 49). For  Romania, see Subbarao and Mehra (1995, p. 22).
"There  may be some similarity between the recent distributional outcomes in transition economies and in the West. In both,
"winners"  seem to be the people employed in non-tradables; losers,  blue-coUar workers whose industries became exposed to
foreign competition.
'For  eastern  Germany,  see  Bird, Schwarze and Wagner (1992);  for Poland,  World Bank (1994,  p.  93);  for the Czech
republic and Slovakia, Chase (1994); for Slovenia, Vodopivec and Orazem (1994).
"It is also worth noticing that, after fitting the standard human capital regression, all studies find that the unexplained portion
of the earnings variation is greater after the transition. The conjuncture is that firm- and individual-specific factor that are not
captured by education or experience are now much more important than before.  The goodness-of-the-fit is about the same as
obtained by the standard human capital models in Western economies.21
The success of private entrepreneurs  needs no explanations. They have done quite well,
and,  it seems, even better than the official data show. First,  because  some of them who have
become very rich are unlikely ever to take part in any survey, and second, because they seem,
on the whole, to be particularly  keen to underreport their incomes.
City people have done better than rural folks. Cities are where most of the demand for
new skills has been located. Large cities  have lower  rates of unemployment and poverty than
the rest of the country. Almost all capital or large cities have unemployment rates  1/2 or less of
the country average (see Table 3).
Table 3
Unemployment rates in capital cities and country-wide
Capital city  Country average  Date
Warsaw; Krakow (Poland)  7.9 and 7.5  15.5  May 1994
Riga (Latvia)  2.2  6.5  end-1994
Budapest (Hungary)  2.6  8.5  end- 1992
Bratislava (Slovakia)  5.1  15.2  Jan.  1995
Bucharest (Romania)  5.6  10.9  June 1994
Prague  (Czech republic)  0.2  3.5  April  1994
Finally,  women  seem to  have done  better  than men,  mostly because the  increase  in
demand has been for those services that were traditionally under-developed and under-paid in
socialism  (e.g.  banking,  tourism,  accounting),  and  strongly  "feminized".  Improvement  in
women's  relative wages should not,  however, let us forget that often blatant discrimination of
women  has increased  and  that elimination of  subsidized child care,  and  sometimes  abortion
rights, has affected them disproportionately more than men.
Fact 6. Growing urban-rural and regional inequality.
The fact that the city folks have gained has the two following implications. First,  farmers
seem to have lost,  in relative terms, to  workers. 46 Table 4 illustrates that, with the exception
of Romania and Kyrgyzstan,  in all other ten countries,  the relative position of farmers either
remained unchanged (in three) or worsened (in seven). In  some countries,  worsening was due
to the removal of subsidies that provided cheap inputs for farmers and assured them relatively
'Workers  include both white- and blue-collar workers employed in the public and mixed sectors (but not the self-employed
and the small-scale private sector).22
high margins. 47 In the Czech and Slovak republics,  and Poland the explicit parity policy that
linked farmers'  incomes to those  of workers  was abandoned.In  yet others  (e.g.  the Baltics,
Ukraine,  Albania,  Bulgaria),  large  dislocation  of  the  farm  sector  occurred  as  land  was
privatized,  collective  farms  disbanded,  but  uncertainly  regarding  ownership  and  confusion
reigned.
The second implication is increased regional inequality. Examples include Budapest vs.
the rest of Hungary, Warsaw vs. South-east Poland, western vs. eastern Latvia and Estonia. The
industrial areas,  developed  in  the  1950's  and  1960's,  based  on  attracting  labor force  from
villages,  and  oriented  in  their  production  towards  the  Eastern  markets,  have  suffered  the
most. 48 The  current  restructuring  is  partly  the  undoing  of  the  misguided  Communist
industrialization. In most hard-hit countries (Romania, Armenia) some urban dwellers go back
to the land. As a clear indicator of social demodemization in these countries, the importance of
income in kind rises.
Table 4
Change in the relative position of farmers vis-a-vis workers
(comparing 1987-88 with 1992-93)
Change in relative  Farmers better off in  Farmers=workers  Workers better off
position  1987-88  in 1987-88
Farmers  win  Romania
Kyrgyzstan
The same  Belarus  Slovakia
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  C zech




Note:  Workers'  relative  position  improves  if the  ratio between  worker-farmer  per capita  income  has improved
by more than  3 percentage  points.
Source:  PRDTE  data base.
Fact 7.  Pensioners hold their ground.
Pensioners  seem, on average, to have retained their relative position vis-a-vis workers.
471n the Czech republic,  agricultural subsidies as a share of GDP decreased from 4.2 percent in 1989 to 0.8 percent in 1993
(from Mladek,  1994, p.  5).
'See  also Blanchard, Commander and Corricelli  (1995, pp. 320-23).23
Pensioners'  relative position stayed unchanged in 7 countries, improved in 5,  and got worse in
6 (see Table 5). In Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, where pensions account for almost 15 percent
of GDP, and the pension/wage ratio stands at its historical high (see Figure 5), they have even
gained relative to workers.  They same is the case in Central  Asian republics.  However,  the
pension system crisis severely afflicting Eastern Europe and parts of the FSU is less of an issue
in Central Asia because of a  much younger population.
There is a interesting bifurcation in the position of pensioners. In Central Europe, where
pensioners were, prior to the transition, well-off in relation to workers, their position has further
improved.  In  the European part  of the former  Soviet Union,  and  in Romnania  and  Bulgaria,
where the average pension-to-average wage ratio was historically low (ranging between 35 and
45 percent),  pensioners have either lost compared to workers, or just  maintained their relative
position (see Table 5).
Figure 5
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Note:  Average  pension to average  wage  (in percent).
Juxtaposing this finding to the earlier point regarding the relative loss for farmers, leads
us to the conclusion that the approximate order  of gain by social class during the transition  is
as follows: private  sector people and the self-employed >  workers  =  pensioners  >  farmers.
If one were asked,  in 1990, to make the guess about these rankings,  chances are that he would
have erred by assuming that pensioners would fare the worst (but,  then, he would have erred
even more by failing to forecast the huge decreases in income). Why have pension expenditures
shown themselves to be rather sticky? To this question, which is important for two reasons, we
turn  next.  First,  pensions  represent  by  far  the  largest  chunk  of  cash  social  expenditures
(accounting for 70 to 80 percent of them). The continuation of current pension trends is fiscally
unsustainable, or, at the very least, incompatible with faster investment and growth. 49 Pension
"See Krumm, Milanovic and Walton (1994. Chapter 2).24
reform is needed. It is important to try  to explain why it has been slow in coming.  Second,
pensions are at the heart of the very sharp trade-off between the welfare of the elderly and the
young which is currently being played out in all the transition economies.
Table 5
Change in the relative position of pensioners vis-a-vis workers
(comparing 1987-88 with 1992-93)
Initial (1987-88) pension-wage ratio
Change in relative  Below 40%  Between 40 and  Above 50%
position  50%
Pensioners win  Kyrgyzstan  Slovenia
Turkmenistan  Poland
Ukraine




Pensioners lose  Lithuania  Bulgaria  Czech
Estonia  Slovakia
Latvia
Note:  Improvement  (deterioration)  requires  that  the  1992-93 pension-to-wage  ratio  has increased  (decreased),
by more  than 3 percentage  points.  Source:  PRDTE  data base.25
Section 3
THE  KEY ISSUES OF SOCIAL POLICY:
PENSION REFORM AND BETI'ER TARGETING OF SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
The two key issues in social policy reforms are the pension reform and improvement
of  social  assistance.  They  are  the  key  issues  for  different  reasons.  The  pension  reform's
importance stems from financial considerations: pensions account for between 7 and 15 percent
of GDP in transition economies, and for 70 to 80 percent of all cash social transfers. The reform
of social assistance is needed to prevent massive increases in destitution during the transition.
Its  main motivation  is  thus humanitarian  or  welfarist  (minimization of  utility losses  of  the
population) and political (to prevent backlash against the transition). In both reforms,  incentive
issues also  play  a  role,  although  incentive  issues  are  probably  subsidiary  to  the  two  key
objectives: financial and political. Examples of incentive considerations that must be taken into
account  in  the  design  of  the  reforms  are:  for  pensions,  the  current  non-actuarial  pension
calculations that lead people to choose early retirement and then continue working; and for social
assistance,  100 percent  withdrawal  of  benefits  which  makes recipients  indifferent  between
working and not working.
THE  ISSUE OF PENSIONS: RISING SHARE OF PENSIONS IN GDP 49
In all East European countries, pensions spending as a share of GDP increased during
the transition.  The average  (unweighted) increase between  1987-88 and  1993 is 3 percentage
points of GDP:  from  an average of 7.4  percent  to  10.3 (see Table  6).  The most  spectacular
increases were recorded in Poland and Slovenia where the share rose by respectively 8 and 4
percentage points. The situation is less dramatic in the former Soviet Union for two reasons.
First,  historically,  pension  spending  was  less-even  in  the  parts  of  the  USSR  that  were
demographically  similar  to  Eastern  Europe-because  the  pension-wage  ratios  were  lower.
Second,  the share of pensions  in GDP has remained about the same in the Slavic republics,
Moldova,  and the Baltics (at under 7 percent), and in Central Asia (6 percent).  Overall, out of
20 countries, pension spending as a share of GDP decreased by more than I GDP percentage
point in only three: Estonia, Moldova,  and Kyrgyzstan. In seven others,  it remained within  +
GDP percentage point where it was before the transition. In ten countries,  it went up.
It is useful to illustrate the problem with a simple "back of the envelope" calculation. The
composition of Eastern European population is such that 'h of the population are the young, little
more than 1/2  is of the working age (between 15 and 55, for women, or 60 for men), and some
20 percent are the people of the retirement age. However, large numbers of early and invalidity
pensioners make the actual number of pension recipients greater than the number of people of
pensionable age. We can then, for simplicity, put the number of pension recipients at  1/4 of the
population.  This gives  about 2 working-age persons per  each pensioner.  But,  only  about 80
49For a very comprehensive review of the pension issue see World Bank (1994a; Chapter 8).26
percent of the active population are in labor force. The ratio between wage earners (or earners
in general because many of them may be self-employed) and pensioners thus becomes 1.6 to 1.
Finally, add to that 10 percent of labor force that is jobless. The ratio between the employed and
the pensioners declines further to 1.5 to 1. Now,  let the average pension to average wage ratio
be relatively conservatively set at 50 percent.  We then have the requirement that for each $1.5
paid out in net wages, there should be $0.5 paid for pension contributions. This gives a rate of
payroll  taxation for  pensions  alone equal  to  33 percent--more  or  less what  that  rate  is  in
transition  economies.  When we add to that all other benefits that are financed out of payroll
(contributions for sickness benefits, maternity benefits, family allowance, unemployment benefits
etc), about 40 percent or more of net wages are "earmarked"  for various social transfers.  Then
if wages account for about 40 percent of GDP, pensions will amount to some 13 percent of GDP
and total cash transfers to  16 percent.
Is the pension problem in the formerly  socialist economies a new problem? No-it  has
been there, simmering even before the transition as population was aging and liberal retirement
provisions  were getting  more out of  step with  stagnant incomes.  However,  several features,
some  of them  linked with the  transition,  some of them  concurrent  with  the transition  have
aggravated the problem. First,  for the concurrent  issues. The mere passage of time makes the
problem of how to provide for the elderly more acute, because all East European countries, the
Baltics and the Slavic republics of the FSU have an aging population. Thus, the passage of five
years alone made the problem  more serious. Second, for the features related to the transition.
There was, due to fears of unemployment, an increase in the already prevalent practice of early
retirement. As staffing was cut, workers close to their retirement age either took the opportunity
to retire,  or were encouraged to do  so. The numbers of the relatively young retirees  swelled:
for example,  in Poland,  between 1989 and  1992, about 500,000 people benefitted from early
retirement  related to industrial restructuring. 50 This is almost 1/3  of the increase in the number
of  pensioners  between  these  two  years.  Loss  of job  for  many  meant  that  the  number  of
contributors declined. Growth of private sector did not contribute much to revenues both because
of  its  still small size, and,  more importantly,  high  tax evasion. The number  of contributors
declined  precisely  when  the  number  of  pensioners  rose.  The  fact  that  the  transition  was
accompanied  by  severe  declines  in  income  made  the  problem  even  more  acute  because
distributional conflicts are sharper when the size of the cake is shrinking.
Our next issues are two. First,  how can we explain that pensions did not contract faster
than wages?  We  saw  in  Table  5  that  the pension-wage  ratio  in  seven  out  of  20  countries
remained the same and in six increased.  The pension outlays/GDP ratio remained the same in
seven  countries  and  rose  in  nine.  In  other  words,  what  is  the  explanation  for  pension
"stickiness"? Second, what, in the area of pension reform, was done so far in various countries
that warrants attention.
"OAnother  I  million  also  retired  early.  but  in  connection  with  other  provisions  on  work  in  harmful  or  difficult  conditions.
See  Galinowska  (1994,  pp.32-3).27
Why are pensions sticky?
There  are  several possible  reasons.  First,  in countries where  inflation already existed
before the transition, pension rules allowed for indexation. This protected them from inflation,
whether anticipated or not. This  was the case in Poland, Hungary and the former Yugoslavia.
Since the  rules  were  legislated,  they were  difficult to  change.  When  real  incomes began to
decline, the existence of these relatively inflexible rules meant that pensions continued to reflect
increases in the cost of living more or less adequately whereas wages did not. In countries where
indexation did not exist prior to transition as in the former Soviet Union, pensions were at first
rapidly  eroded  by  inflation.  However,  in  conditions  that  were  approaching  hyper-inflation,
pensioners learned the importance of indexation, and newly introduced legislations arrested or
decelerated further erosion.5'
Second,  since  no-one,  as  we  saw  in  Section  2,  anticipated  GDP  declines  of  such
magnitudes, ex-ante pension spending plans turned out to be more generous than warranted by
the actual GDP outturns.
Third,  pensions benefitted from  the perception that they were a  relatively low priority
issue. When the transition started, launched often with the "Big Bang", pension reform was low
among reform priorities.  The dominant issues were  removal of subsidies, price liberalization,
unification of the exchange rate, control of inflation, reform of the banking sector, creation of
the capital market, privatization. Indeed, new governments' administrative capacity was stretched
to the extreme. At that early stage of reforms, the fate that befell pensions was the same as that
of family allowances at the time of the big social reform in France under Leon Blum. Asked
why family allowances  were  not touched, Leon Blum disarmingly replied:  "We forgot  about
them  52
51Quarterly indexation of pensions was introduced in Russia from January 1993-one  year after the price liberalization drove
practically all the pensions down to the minimum level.
5
2Quoted  from Murard (1993, p.53).28
Table 6
Pensions and total cash social transfers as percent of GDP
Country  |  Pensions  Total Cash
l  ____________________________________  l  l______________I T  ransfers
1987-88  1993  1987-88  1993
Belarus  5.7  5.5  5.7a  6.9
Bulgaria  7.7  9.6  11.3  10.4
Czech  Republic  8.0  8.0  11.2  10.7
Estonia  6.9  5.6  10.8  9.8
Hungary  9.0  10.4  13.1  17.5
Kazakhstan  5.7  4.5  5.7a  4.7b
Kyrgyzstan  6.8  7.2  10.0  16.2
Latvia  5.9  9.6  7.4  12.3
Lithuania  6.6  6.8  8.3  10.8
Moldova  7.1  5.9  7.9  6.2c
Poland  7.1  14.8  8.7  17.8
Romnania  3.9  6.8  9.4  9.0
Russia  6.2  7.2  7.9  8.9
Slovak  Republic  7.4  9.6  11.3  11.7
Slovenia  8.7  13.0  11.1  16.3
Turkmenistan  4.0  4.6  4.4  4.6a
Ukraine  7.9  7.1  9.5  8.2
Uzbekistan  5.4  9.2  9.3  12.5
EEurope  7.4  10.3  10.9  13.5
Baltic  6.5  7.3  8.8  11.0
Slavic  &  Moldova  6.7  6.6  7.7  8.0
Central  Asia  5.5  5.4  7.4  8.5
Note: Regional means aru unweighted  avcrages. Source: World Bank PRDTE daua files. Total cash transfers include pensions,  various family benefits,
sick leave  benefts  (including  maternity  leave) and unemployment allowances.
a  = includes only pensions;  b  =  only pensions  and unemployment benefits;  c =  only pensions and sick leave  benefits;29
The fourth reason is that pensioners have became a very important political constituency.
We saw that in East Europe, the Baltics and the Slavic republics of the former Soviet Union,
pension  recipients  represent between 20  and 25  percent  of the population  (see also  Table  7
below).  In  Slovenia,  Bulgaria,  Hungary  and  the  Czech  republic,  they  are  approaching  30
percent.  This  represents  between  1/3  and  40  percent  of  the  voting  population. 53 Not  all
pensioners entirely depend for their livelihood on pensions. In the FSU, one out of each five or
six pensioners has a part-time or full-time fonnal job;  in Eastern Europe, perhaps one in ten. 54
Some are employed in the informal sector. Many have income in kind, often from the plots of
land they cultivate. However, for all of them, pensions are an important, and for most of them,
the most  important  source of  income. Thus  their  interests are  virtually identical:  to protect
pensions from eroding."  This  makes them  into a powerful  political group.  They are a  large
single-issue constituency. 56 Further,  the success or failure in the defense of that single issue is
very transparent-as  practically everything depends on the pension formula that is understandable
to most  people.  Thus  pensioners  combine  several elements needed for  a  successful political
mobilization:
*they are numerous;
ethey  fight for a single issue:
*the  issue is transparent;
*they  have enough time to spend fighting for this issue. 57
The fifth reason for downward inflexibility of pension spending lies with what Lindert
(1991) has dubbed "affinity".  As the population ages, more people get closer to the retirement
age and have an interest in keeping the current system unchanged. They feel greater affinity of
interest  with pensioners  and  vote accordingly.  The affinity  is particularly  strong  if there  are
many individuals without children. The key role they assign to the state is provision of benefits
for the old age. They are not concerned with family benefits, not even with wages of the next
generation as they would be if they had children and regarded them as insurance for the old age.
53For the  so-called  plurahst  hypothesis  on  pensioners  as  voters  see  Williamson  and  Pampel  (1993).
54'heir  numbers  have  declined  fast  in  Eastern  Europe.  In  1987,  about  a quarter  of pensioners  in the  Czech  republic  were
employed;  in  1992,  only  9 percent.  In Slovakia,  over  the  same period,  the  share  decreased  from  21 to 7 percent  (calculated  from
the  countries'  Statistical  Yearbooks  tor  1993).
5
5Their  interests  are  not  entirely  coincidental,  as  there  are  potential  conflicts  between  different  cohorts  of pensioners  whose
pensions  are  calculated  according  to  different  formulas  ("old  vintage"  vs.  "new  vintage"  pensioners,  invalidity  pensioners  vs.
old  age  pensioners  etc).  The  differences  between  the  old  and  new  cohorts  of pensioners,  to the  detriment  of the  old,  used  to  be
very  large  in  several  countries  (the  Soviet  Union,  Poland).  The  1990 changes  in the  Pohsh  pension  law,  for  example,  improved
the  position  of  the  old  pensioners  but  at  a significant  cost  to  the  pension  fund.
5
61n most  countries,  pensioners  tend  to support  socialist  or former  communist  parties  as  these  parties  are thought  to  be more
inclined  to  protect  pensioners'  interests.  In Sofia,  a week  before  the  December  1994  parliamentary  elections,  in  anticipation  of
socialists'  victory,  pensioners  organized  a  large  celebration  with  singing  and  dancing.  In Poland,  Estonia  and  Hungary,  those
over  60 years  of age  voted  overwhelmingly  for the  left-wing  parties  (including  former  Communists)  in  1994  and  1995 elections.
"
7And,  thanks  to  the  disappearance  of the  queues,  they  now  have  more  free  time  than  in  the  past.30
This  is,  of  course,  not  unique to  the  transition  economies.  The  same reasons  explain  why
pensioners in developed countries have, in the course of the last 20 years, become less poor than
the average, and children poorer than the average (the exact reverse of the situation twenty years
ago). 58 The feeling of  "affinity" in transition  economies was increased as  many redundancies
were  "solved"  through  early  retirement.  Those  who  have  not  retired,  but  see  themselves
threatened  by  an  early  retirement,  also  try  to  protect  themselves  and  vote  for  maintaining
favorable pension rules.
The (limited) reform experience
It is not surprising that against this background, pension spending increased, and almost
no  countries  except  the Baltics  were  able  to  change the  pension  formulas,  with  a  view  of
reducing the fiscal burden,  let alone to reform their pension systems.
The score card of pension reform is indeed limited. Pensionable age was raised in Estonia
(by six months per year until it reaches 65 for men and 60 for women),  Czech republic (two
months per  year until it reaches 62 for men and between 57 and 61 for women), Slovenia (by
2  years) and Romania.s9 These increases,  however,  do not lead to  substantial savings in the
short-run. Raising the retirement age by six month every year for both men and women, saves
(in case of Poland) only about 0.3-0.4 percent of GDP annually. 60 Moreover,  to the extent that
the young unemployed workers and the old workers are substitutes, one needs to offset against
these savings the additional outlays for  unemployment benefits.  If the young and the old are
perfect substitutes, and an average pension is twice as high as an average unemployment benefit,
savings are only one-half of the estimated amount.
More  important reforms  are needed for  a reduction in overall  spending.  Reduction in
spending combined with the need to protect the lowest pension (i.e. to keep it at least at the level
of the poverty line), translates into a compression of pensions. The compression may be come
about in three different way.
*  A flat or almost flat pension structure where everyone receives the same, or almost
the same, pension can be introduced either as a temporary or permanent measure. The implicit,
"8in the US, the share of the aged (65 +  years of age) in the bottom quintile of consumption expenditures decreased from
38 percent in 1960-61 to 22 percent in 1991-92. At the same time, their share in the top quintile went up from  10 to 15 percent.
The reverse change for the young people, mostly children,  is even more striking. In  1960-61, only 13 percent  of the bottom
quintile were those under 25 years of age.  In  1991-92, 36 percent of the bottom quintile were the young (see Johnson,  Shipp
and Jacobs,  1994, Appendix Table E). According to US Bureau of the Census, over the same period, the percentage of the poor
among the aged decreased from 35 to  12 percent;  for the population as a whole,  the decline in the poverty rate was from 22
percent to 13 (see Levitan,  1990, p. 18).
5 9Hungary is planning to do the same although the bill has not reached the parliament yet.
50A point was made that increasing the retirement age was particularly  unfair toward women who,  in the former Soviet
Union, raised children in difficult conditions while continuing to work.  According to one opinion, women's retirement age should
be reduced  by a year  fir  each child (see Diena,  Russian edition of a Riga daily, February 2,  1995, p.2).31
even if weak, linkage between contributions and pensions is severed. Latvia and Estonia provide
examples. In Estonia,  since 1992, the old-age pension amounts are calculated according to the
following formula:
Pension  = 0  . 6  *  Minimum  wage  + A  * years  of  service
where A =the  accrual factor. People who have worked the same number of years,  regardless of
their wages and contributions,  receive the same payment. The situation is the same in Latvia. 6"
*  Another way to compress pensions is through differential indexation, such that higher
pensions are not fully indexed or are indexed less than lower pensions.  Differential indexation
was used in  Romania  and  in  Russia after  price  liberalization  in early  1992. All pensioners
received the same absolute increases, thus reducing pension differentials.
*  The third  way in which compression occurs  is,  as it were,  by chaos: pensions are
equalized through payment  delays. No new pension  rules are enacted. The system ostensibly
stays the same, but real pension amounts depend much more on when the pension is received
than on what the official rules are. This happened, at different periods, in the Ukraine, Georgia,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and Macedonia. As can be seen from the
list, it occurred in conditions of hyper-inflation and exposure to war.
The three approaches differ in terms of "orderliness"  with which they are implemented.
Under  the  first  approach,  the  new  pension  rules  have  to  be  legislated.  Under  the  second
approach,  the  pension-formation  rules  remain  unchanged,  and,  temporarily,  the  type  of
indexation changes. Under the third approach,  nothing needs to be changed: chaos takes care
of everything.
6 "The  Latvian formula is
pension  = w  (0.3  + A  * years  of  service)
where w=average  wage,  and A=accrual  factor equal to 0.4%.32
Table 7
Pensions in the Baltics and Central Europe
Pension  Average pension-  Real  Total real
recipients as  average wage  average  pension
percent  of the  ratio  pension  spending
population  (in  %)  (1987=  (1987=100)
_______  ~~~~ ~~100)  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
87-88  92-93  87-88  92-93  92-93  92-93
Estonia  22.2  24.0  39  42  50  42
Latvia  21.9  25.2  39  34  57  74
Lithuania  22.0  23.9  35  29  61  52
Baltics  22.0  24.4  38  35  56  56
Hungary  22.7  27.4  59  62  84  93
Poland  17.4  22.4  48  64  103  147
Czech republic  27.8  29.4  56  49  72  85
Slovakia  22.5  25.3  44  43  76  89
Slovenia  23.8  29.8  54  58  67  90
Central Europe  22.8  26.9  52  55  80  101
Note:  Regional  means  are unweighted  averages.
Source:  World Bank  PRDTE  data files.
How were Baltic countries able to change pension rules and contain pension costs?  The
contrast  between  the  Baltics  and  Central  European  countries  (including  Poland)  is  striking
because their original starting points were either similar, or Central European countries'  position
for  cost-cutting was more  advantageous.  First,  the Baltics  started the transition  with  a  low
pension-wage  ratio  (under  40  percent),  while  Poland,  Hungary,  Slovenia  and  former
Czechoslovakia had pension-wage ratios between 45 and 60 percent  (see Table 7). Four years
into the transition,  the ratios for  the Baltics have gone further down,  while those  in Central
European countries, with the exception of the Czech republic, have stayed the same or gone up.
Second, since the wage (the denominator in our pension-wage ratio) declined even faster in the
Baltics, the real cut in the pensions in the Baltics was even more substantial than indicated by
the pension-wage ratio alone. Between 1987-88 and  1992-93, the average pension and pension33
spending in the Baltics were cut by 45 percent. 62 Meanwhile,  in Central Europe,  real pension
was reduced by 20 percent, and real pension spending was flat. Therefore, despite relatively low
pensions at the onset of the transition, and sharper declines in real GDPs, the Baltics ended up
with the constant, and Central European countries with the sharply increasing,  share of pension
spending in GDP. The explanation for the difference in the outcome lies probably in the sphere
of political economy.
Three elements may explain "Baltic exceptionalism".
*Strong  feeling of discontinuity with the previous regime reflected in the feeling that it
was  foreign  occupation.  The  implicit  contract  between  the  individual  who  made  pension
contributions and the state was much less compelling that in other countries where the feeling
of country's  "ownership" in the decisions by which pensions were determined was stronger. As
an  illustration,  consider  a  statement  by  Latvia's  Minister  of  Welfare  who  addressed  the
pensioners as follows: "you do not need big pensions, because you worked under the Communist
regime,  and your work accomplished nothing".63  It  is unthinkable that such a statement could
have been made elsewhere-without  any apparent effect on the minister (although the pensioners
associations did protest).
*The  fact that many losers who are ethnic Russians are not citizens and cannot vote.
Their political clout is negligible. Although their demographic structure is not much different
from  the  rest  of  the  Baltic population,  many more  of  them  are  located  in  cities  with  few
complementary sources of income. In contrast, more of the older native Baltic inhabitants (who
are  citizens and  vote)  live  in  rural  areas  where  they have access  to  other  income  sources.
Pension cuts affect them less.
eThe  fact that pension-wage ratio in the USSR was lower than in Eastern Europe made
it easier to  introduce a  low flat  rate at around 30 percent.  However,  this is only a  partially
satisfactory argument because it explains only why low flat rate was acceptable, not why flat rate
as such was acceptable. Central European countries could have established a higher flat rate.
Some preliminary conclusions
The pension changes to date suggest that:
oThe pension reform is not primarily a technical but rather a political economy issue.
The difference in outcomes between, for example, the Baltic states and Central Europe, cannot
be explained in terms of the difference in the initial conditions, population shares of pensioners,
62The 45 percent reduction in pension spending is calculated from  the unweighted pension expenditures,  that is, pension
spending in 1987-88 in each country,  regardless of its absolute amount, is considered as  100.
63See Baltic Observer BM:34
or features of the pension system. None of these were different. The difference in outcomes is
explained by the difference in the political clout of the constituencies. This is hardly surprising
since  social  insurance  systems  historically  were,  and  remain  today,  strongly  influenced by
political elements. That this is not peculiar to the transition economies, but to all countries, and
democracies in particular,  can be noted from the fact that politics play a key role in determining
the outcome of pension reforms in developed countries.  Sweden, Italy, Germany, France have
all begun with various intensity and success to reform their systems. In all cases, the political
rapport de force is crucial for the outcome.
*The  changes in the pension  system should start within the parameters given by the
existing PAYG system without waiting to introduce more ambitious private and funded systems.
The  introduction  of  the  funded  systems  may  take  years.  The  need  for  reforms  is  more
immediate. The key ingredients of the immediate reforms are reasonably well-known,  and not
particularly contentious (in theory). They are,  in order of increasing  "radicalism":
*penalization  (via taxation or through reduced pensions) of working pensioners,
*tighter  eligibility rule for disability pensions,
selimination  of many early retirement provisions,
*actuarial  early retirement pensions for those who still qualify,
*gradual  increase in the retirement age and its equalization for women and men,
eincrease  in the number of years of earning that are used in the calculation of pension,
sand,  finally, if necessary, pension compression through either differential or partial (i.e.
not full) indexation, or all but complete severance between the contribution and benefits (by a
removal of the wage element from the pension determination formula).
Social assistance reform
The problem defined: increasing number of claimants and shortage of money
The second area of reform concerns social assistance. Social assistance services in many,
although not all (the exceptions are  Central Europe and Bulgaria), transition  economies were
rudimentary and  many of them still remain so.  Social assistance offices often distribute only
benefits  in-kind  and  are  concerned  mostly  with  what  may  be  called  dysfunctional
households-that  is, single parent families, the handicapped, alcoholics, people recently released
from prison, and so forth.  The social assistance workers seem to think that their principal role
is to help particular disadvantaged categories of households. Households and individuals are, as35
it were, placed in different "niches".  Social workers do not think of the poor or the indigent in
terms  of a  generic  category  of  people whose transitory,  or  sometimes long-term,  income  is
below a certain minimum.
Since the beginning of the transition,  spending on family benefits as a share of GDP has
increased in the FSU countries where universal family allowance was introduced in 1989 only.
It is now fairly high in Central Asia, where, due to demographic structure, it reaches 2½ percent
of GDP. In Eastern Europe it has been flat in terms of GDP,  and, of course,  declining in real
terms (see Table 8). Comparable data on social assistance spending are not available. However,
for the countries where we have the data, there was a clear increase in spending as a share of
GDP.  Higher  spending  was  driven  by  -in  some  cases-  huge  increases  in  claimants  and
recipients of social assistance. Thus,  in Poland,  the number of recipients rose from little over
1 million in  mid-1980s (21/2  percent  of  the population)  to more than 3 million in  1993, and
spending rose from 0.1 percent  of GDP to 0.5 percent;64  in Hungary, the number of claimants
doubled between  1990 and  1993. Social assistance offices are sometimes overwhelmed by the
sheer number of claimants; even more often, they run out of resources.  In Riga, for example,
the city-defined poverty line at the end of 1993 was Lats 12.9 (about $22) per capita per month.
The city authorities, however, estimated that they had only 5 percent of the total amount needed
to help everyone who could have claimed benefits based on that poverty line. 65 In Poland,  in
November 1993, the legislature passed the law authorizing special benefits for expecting mothers
with low incomes. The financing, supposed to come from  the Center,  never materialized,  and
local authorities,  short of funds,  simply failed to provide any  benefits. In Ukraine,  the  1994
centrally-decreed increase in allowance for War veterans was never implemented due to shortage
of funds on the local level.  The twin pressures of people and lack of resources  mean that the
current systems ought to be reformed with two objectives in mind:
X  How  to  reduce the number of  people who are eligible  or  who think they may be
eligible for social assistance, that  is, how to  "pre-screen" the candidates before they come to
social assistance offices;
* How  to better use the money, that is how to improve targeting.
64See World Bank, Povertv  in  Poland.  Chapter 4.
sNote also  that  the  official  poverty  line  at the  time  was  Lats  36!  And  this  was  not  the  "accounting"  social  minimum line
(meaning that it is derived by the "armchair" economists never to be implemented), but the "minimum crisis basket",  explicitly
worked out to serve as a poverty line during the transition.36
Table 8
Spending on family benefits in selected
transition economies
Family benefits as  % of  Real spending on family benefits
GDP  in 1992-93
87-88  92-93  1987=100
Bulgaria  2.6  2.3  46
Czech Republic  2.0  1.8  71
Estonia  2.3  2.0  47
Hungary  2.7  4.5  137
Kyrgyzstan  2.3  4.1  182
Latvia  0.4  2.4  341
Lithuania  1.5  2.0  64
Moldova  0.8  n.a.
Poland  1.4  1.8  107
Romania  5.1  1.8  26
Russia  1.7  0.4  17
Slovak Republic  2.7  3.2  81
Slovenia  1.3  1.3  76
Ukraine  0.4  1.1  199
U  zbekistan  2.5  2.5  111
EEurope  2.5  2.4  83
Baltics  1.4  2.0  151
Slavic & Moldova  1.0  1.2  108
Central  Asia  2.4  3.3  146
Note:  Regional means are unweighted  averages.
Source: World Bank PRDTE data  files.37
The current system
A social assistance  system in a  narrow  sense of cash  help for those whose transitory
income is low did not exist in the past.  As explained in Section 1, the development of social
assistance system was limited because it was: (i) redundant because the intrinsic features of the
system such as full employment, high participation rates of women,  free health and education,
guaranteed state pensions, and subsidies on essential goods, implied that few people would have
very  low transitory incomes, and  (ii) because of the dim view that the authorities took of the
poor.
If we define the three  key features of West European social assistance systems as:  (i)
there is an official poverty line; (ii) having income below the poverty line and assets below a
certain minimum is a sufficient condition for eligibility; and (iii) social assistance offices try,
in principle, to cover the entire gap between the poverty line and actual income, no country in
Eastern Europe had such a system. We can call such a system the Minimum Income Guarantee
(MIG) system.'  Czechoslovakia's  social assistance apparently came closest to  it, but  due to
the sensitivity with which Communist authorities treated the issue of poverty, the rules of social
assistance remained opaque. It appears, however, that social assistance offices in Czechoslovakia
tried to cover the entire gap between the poverty line and actual income. 67
The existing systems in the transition economies was differ from MIG in the following
respects. Although income testing is an integral component of the system, having an income less
than the poverty line is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for receiving social aid.
Criteria other than income must be fulfilled as well. These are mostly related to low earning
capacity  (almost  zero  elasticity  of  labor  supply):  single-parent  households,  presence  of
handicapped or elderly members,  alcoholism in the family etc.  For example, Polish  1990 law
on  social assistance  lists  eleven  such conditions,  at least  one  of  which,  in  addition  to  low
income,  must  be  present  to  be  eligible  for  social  assistance. 68 The  Czech  1991  law  also
stipulates that individuals must be unable to  "increase their income due to their age or health
situation".'  Social assistance is viewed as temporary  and is most often provided in kind (e.g.,
hot meals or food vouchers, drugs, help in looking after the children, payment for kindergartens,
wood and coal, payment of utilities and rent). Social assistance does not aim to fully cover the
difference between the poverty line and actual income. How much is covered depends on the
judgment of local social assistance workers and is even impossible to determine exactly because
'Obviously,  in reality,  not all of the gap will be identified (less than  100 percent  take-up rate),  nor  filled (mistakes in
assessment).  Also, the MIG  system can be implemented in different ways:  through direct payments up to the poverty  line,
universal negative income tax (same flat amount paid to everybody and then subject to taxation), or  specific negative income
tax to the poor  (akin to earned income credit).
67According to Vecernik (1991, p.2) quoted by Sipos (1992, p.3 8).
68The Law became effective in January  1991. For the text,  see Fijalkowski (1992, pp. 63-85).
69See  Vecernik (1994, p.  7).38
of the prevalence of in-kind assistance. We can call such systems Income Testing as Screening
device (ITS) to indicate that income testing does exist, but no minimum income guarantee. 70
None  of the  three  MIG  features  hold  in  an  ITS  system.  The poverty  line  is not  an
official,  published and publicized,  line,  even if  there  is a de facto  poverty  line that  social
assistance offices follow when screening the candidates. 7"  Secondly, having income below the
poverty line is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for assistance. And thirdly, the
offices do not try,  even in principle, to fully fill the poverty gap.
ITS systems are in existence in practically all the countries in Eastern Europe and the
FSU. Poland, and Czech and Slovak republics and Estonia have officially an ITS system where
low income plus family dysfunctionality or zero elasticity of labor supply are the requirements
for  social  assistance.  The  situation  is similar  in Hungary,  Bulgaria,  the successor  states of
Yugoslavia, Romania. In Russia and Ukraine, a "weaker" form of an ITS system is applied. The
major difference is that low income is often not an explicit necessary condition for receiving the
assistance-but  rather  a "desirable"  condition.  Although there are  poverty lines which  social
assistance are  supposed to follow  (in a country as  vast as  Russia,  the lines differ widely by
region), these are "weak" lines since a lot depends on social workers' judgment,  and, of course,
availability  of  funds. 72 It  is  still  an  ITS  system-income  is  used  for  screening  the
candidates-but  more than elsewhere is left to judgment.
How to improve targeting?
The central issue in the reform of social assistance is how to improve targeting. Targeting
can be improved in two ways. One is to move from ITS to MIG-type systems.  The latter,  in
theory, should achieve perfect targeting. The second course is to retain the ITS system (and for
those  with  "weak"  ITS  systems to  move to  "firm"  ITS  systems),  but  to  reinforce  indicator
targeting. In order to reduce the number of potential claimants whose incomes must be assessed,
transfers would then be focused on the best and firm (i.e. difficult to hide or manipulate) proxies
of poverty like number of children,  age of the household head, unemployment, and  so forth.
Also, the key economic variables (minimum pension,  minimum unemployment benefit, family
allowance etc.)  need to  be  structured  in such a  way that  most of their  recipients cannot be
candidates for social assistance (see Section "Some essential rules for transfer payments" below).
Social assistance would be the last resort, dealing with those that have "fallen through the net".
But it would remain an ITS system in the sense that there would be no attempt to fill the entire
'"The  definitions  of  MIG  and  ITS  systems  are  similar  to  respectively  Type  A  system  that  seeks  to  eliminate  poverty,  and
Type  B system  that  only  seeks  to alleviate  it (see  Sipos,  1994).  As Sipos  points  out,  West  European  systems  are  generally  Type
A;  the  US  has  a Type  B  system.
7 "Note  that  there  could  be several  or  even  many  poverty  lines  for  different  parts  of the  country.  Multitude  of poverty  lines
is consistent  with  both  ITS  and  MIG  systems.
72A  regionally  very  diversified  system  does  not  exist  only  in  large  countries  like  Russia  and  Ukraine.  Latvia  too  has  a
regionally-based  social  assistance-such  that  the  poor  in  different  parts  of  the  country  are  treated  differently.39
poverty gap,  nor would low income alone be a sufficient condition for assistance.
The two approaches differ in their attitude toward some of the currently existing benefits
which are reasonably well targeted.  For example, under the "movement to MIG",  there is no
reason to retain family allowance. It can be discontinued altogether (or kept at a very low level),
because everybody who is really poor  should be helped via the guaranteed minimum income.
But, if the second alternative is selected, family allowances would continue to play an important
role. Their role would be to "pre-screen" many of the families-"vault"  them over the poverty
line-so  that they do not come applying for social assistance. 73
Before we move to a comparison of MIG and ITS systems, we shall look at some current
experience with targeting using the 1993 Polish data.
Targeting in practice: an example from Poland
Targeting mistakes are of three types.
* Spillover. Payments to the poor in excess of the amount they need to reach the poverty
line.
a  Inclusion error.  Payments to the non-poor who should not receive social assistance.
X Exclusion error.  Non-payments to the poor.
The first two are also called  "Excess" or E-mistakes  (Stewart and Cornia,  1994); the
third is also called "Failure" or F-mistake.
Excess 74 and failure  mistakes were  analyzed on the individual 1993 Polish  data using
the Heckman-type procedure.  Equation (2) is the "screening" equation,  explaining the process
of "selection into poverty".  Equation (3) explains the determinants of the error of exclusion and
inclusion. It controls for the selection bias by using the reverse Mills-ratio calculated from (2).7
Pi = f  ( Ch,,  Ej,  U,, Mj, IC,,  MC,, SC,,  Vi  )  (2 )
ESi  = f  (Chj,  Ei,  Ai,  Ui,I Mj,  MCi,  SC,  IVj)  (3)
73The focus of family allowances can be improved by some rough income-testing (e.g.,  discontinuing payments to families
with income or wage three or more times higher than the average).
"4"Excess" mistake in this case does not include spillover.
751n order to exactly identify the two equations, we drop large cities from equation (3), and number of adults from equations
(2).40
where
Pi = poverty status of household i prior  to receiving social assistance,
ES;  error  status (binary variable 0,1),
E=  years of education by the head of household,
Ai =  number of adults in household,
Chi =  number of children in household,
U,  =  number of unemployed members in household,
M=  family type status (binary variable:  single mother with children  = 1, all others  =
0),
L=  size of locality (4 types)
We classified a household as "poor" if its expenditures per equivalent adult were less than
the  minimum pension,  which  is the eligibility criterion  for  social assistance  in  Poland.  The
results are shown in Table 9.
Table 9
Determinants of the failure and excess mistakes
of social assistance
Failure to deliver  Excess assistance
Coef.  t-value  Coef.  t-value
Education; household head;  0.117  1.72  -0.178  -1.24
number of years
Number of adults  A.5  2.73  0.184  1.94
Number of children  ......  -4.53  0.432  1.36
Number of the unemployed  -3.61  0.590  1.28
Dummy (omitted: no)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  . . ....  ...  ==
Mother-with-children  322*  -3.59  1.763*  2.22
Diummy  (omitted: very large
Medium city  0.019  0.05  -0.329  1.15
Small city  0.401  0.96  -0.383  1.28
Village  0.009  0.03  0.003  0.07
Millsr  tiol-00;g  :02-761**:  0  -641.3  1.03
**:  Pr>Chi,  at 1
*:  Pr >Chi,  at 5  % (both shaded)  .41
Number of children, presence of the unemployed, of single mothers with children,  and
of more than one adult in a household are strongly associated with the failure to deliver  social
assistance.  The first  three  reduce  the failure  error;  the  third  increases  it.  It  seems  that the
characteristics  such  as  presence  of  children,  the  unemployed  and  single  mothers,  tend  to
convince social workers that households are indeed "needy". On the other hand, presence of an
additional adult makes a household, even if poor,  more likely to be excluded. This is probably
explained by skepticism of social assistance officers regarding the real economic situation of the
household.6 Social  workers  implicitly  assume  that  such  households  have  informal  sector
income. Interviews confirm this: social workers tend to believe that the presence of an additional
adult means that he or she is either involved in some informal sector activity, or (an element of
paternalism) that he should be.  Social workers therefore prefer to withhold aid.
As for the error  of  "excess"  assistance,  we find that none of the variables except the
presence  of single mothers seems to  matter.  Single-parent households are more likely  to be
assisted even if they are not poor.
Interestingly, education of the household head has no influence on either type of errors.
Another important issue in targeting is what are the withdrawal rates (i.e.  by how much
social assistance is reduces as income increases) and how social assistance interacts with labor
income (i.e. if there are incentives to look for a job rather than to rely on state aid). The thick
line in Figure 7 shows disbursed social assistance in Poland as function of pre-social assistance
income."- As income rises,  social assistance is cut in the ratio 1-for-I.  The average withdrawal
rate for the range between 100,000 and 900,000 zloty per equivalent adult is slightly above 100
percent. This is shown by the 45 degrees slope of the regression line (the broken line in Figure
7). After ZI.  900,000,  the withdrawal rate is almost zero, because social assistance no longer
varies (actually it becomes negligible) as income increases. At that point,  incentive to take up
a job is strong. By contrast, up to the level approximately equal to  34 of the poverty line, greater
labor income is irrelevant because all of it is "dissipated" in smaller social assistance. For a one-
person  household,  this  disincentive does not  matter because taking a job  paying at least the
minimum wage would place  him far  to the right in  Figure  7,  beyond the  Zl.  900,000 point
where his income is higher with work. The disincentive does matter, however, in case of a large
family.  There a choice by the household head to take the minimum wage job  might raise the
(equivalent)  pre-social  assistance  household  income  by  only  300-400,000  zloty,  going,  for
example from  Zl.  300,000 to  Zl.  700,000.  But then,  as Figure  7 shows,  all of the increase
would be "dissipated" in smaller social assistance.
'6This view is similar to the "man in the house" rule,  struck out by the US Supreme Court in 1968. The rule was used by
many states to deny AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) to families where "a man  was present in the home even
if he was not legally liable for children's  support.
"This  is the expected social assistance for a given level of income: it gives the average payment of social assistance for all
households including those who receive none.42
Figure 7
Poland 1993: Social assistance paid
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Note:  Units  in 000 zloty.
Poverty  line  is 1,230,000  zloty;  minimum  wage,  1.5 million  ($90).
Of course,  this problem is not specific to transition economies. The withdrawal rates are
often around  100 percent  in  Western  economies  too.  Two  things  may,  however,  make  it
potentially worse in transition economies:
*small  "gap" between the minimum wage and the poverty line,  which implies
that those who decide to look for a job  might not (particularly in case of large
families) increase their family income sufficiently to "escape" the "chopper of 100
percent withdrawal rate, and
*that  in many FSU countries in particular several benefits are "triggered" by the
same income threshold. Then increase in pre-social assistance income beyond that43
threshold might lead to the loss of all benefits, implying a withdrawal  rate in
excess of 100 percent, that is, a reduction  in net income. 78
MIG vs. ITS: A Comparison
High percentage  of targeting errors. Let us look first at the targeting issue if the minimal
income guarantee is adopted. The key issue is how to identify  the poor, that is, ascertain the
exact amount of income. This is difficult because a large part of income of the poor and the
"near poor" is derived from informal activities which are almost impossible to monitor. In
addition, even formal sector income from the small legalized  and legitimate  private businesses
often goes unreported to tax authorities. What in addition makes targeting difficult is that at
some realistic  minimal  guaranteed  income, lots of people  are both slightly  below that income  or
slightly above. That means that approximately,  10 to 12 percent of the population  might find
itself within 10 percentage point of the MIG. (These values are derived from the elasticities
ranging between  0.5 and 0.6, discussed  in Section 2.)  Many of these people may try to claim
the benefit. As the data from a Polish study show, the "excess" error (benefits  given to those
whose income is above the poverty line) is concentrated  in income groups slightly above the
poverty line (see Figure 6). Forty percent of the "excess"  error (both in terms of people and
money spent) concerns those with income 30 percent or less above the poverty line.
Figure 6
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Notes: All the non-poor who have received social assistance=  100.
Poverty line=minimum pension.
7Very often  one finds  that the same  income  threshold  is used to determine  eligibility  for social  assistance,  subsidized  utilities
and child care, lower  transportation  fare etc. By going  over that threshold,  family  might lose more  in lost benefits  than it gets
in higher money (pre-social  assistance)  income.44
If many  of the poor and the "near-poor"  claim the benefits,  their numbers  will overwhelm
social assistance  offices.  This has a further  negative  effect on targeting: identification  of the poor
becomes worse. The "failure" errors rise as the proportion of the poor in a given group of
people increases.  It is relatively  easy to identify  the poor in a group where poverty is rare.  For
example, if one takes a group composed  only of household  with two employed  persons and one
child, living in a town, poverty in such a group is rare, and those households  that happen  to be
poor  are  relatively easily identified. The situation is  very different when one deals with
households where poverty is prevalent. For  example, if one takes households  with 4 or 5
children  where one member is unemployed  and who live in rural areas, many of them may be
around the poverty line. It then becomes  very difficult to tell those who should receive social
assistance from those who should not. This is what may be called the "easy discrimination
effect": among the people who share some demographic  and social characteristics  common  to
the rich, it is easy to target well because the poor stand  out.
Using the Polish 1993 data, we have plotted the "failure" error, that is, of not giving
social assistance  to those who are poor, against the specific  group poverty rates. We divide the
population  into 83 exclusive and exhaustive  groups, using as "dividers", the socio-economic
group (6 such groups), the place of residence (5 types), and the type of household (3 types:
single  parents regardless  of household  size, and small, and large households).  This gives  a total
of 90 groups but since some  of them are empty, we end up with 83 groups. For each group we
calculate  the "failure" to deliver as:
Numrber  of  poor  households  without  social  assistance
total  number  of  poor  households
and the poverty rate in the usual fashion as the number of the poor over the total group
population. The results show that the "failure" error is strongly associated with the group
poverty rate (see Table 10).
Table 10
Error of "failure" to deliver as function of the poverty rate
Coefficient  Std.err.  Adj.R
0.2099**  0.0338  0.3144
**: Highly  significant (1 %).
If we the extend the findings on the "excess" and "failure" errors to the level of the
country as whole, it means that in countries where there are many potential  claimants  for aid,
as in all transition  economies, the frequency  of both types of errors will be high. In countries
where the number of potential  claimants  is small, errors will be less frequent. The poor will be
more easily identified.  This outcome  does not depend  on the intrinsic  quality  of social assistance45
offices (as  it does not  depend in the  example of  Poland  quoted above)  which also  may be
expected to be better in richer countries.
High percentage of targeting errors  means that the costs of poverty alleviation will be
high. As discussed in Section 1, one cannot assume that the costs of poverty elimination based
on perfect targeting (i.e. assuming that all of the money goes only to the poor and in the exactly
required amounts) are anything to go by. These costs, which range, for realistic poverty lines,
between 2 and 3 percent of GDP (see Milanovic,  1994) must not be increased only by a factor
of about 2-a  number derived from Western experience, but by more. The formula is:
PD'  =  HC sh  [11+ ERR (HC)]  =
GDP  GDP  (1)
=PDp  [  1  + ERR  (HC)  I
GDP
where  PD*/GDP  is the "effective" poverty deficit (PD)  as a percent  of GDP.  This  is
equal to the headcount (HC) times the average shortfall of the poor below the poverty line (sh)
divided by GDP-that  is the PD/GDP  "calculated" under the assumption of perfect targeting-
"grossed up" by an error  factor which is a positive function of the poverty headcount (HC). In
Poland, a country with a reasonably developed social assistance system, the "gross up" factor
amounted in 1993 to 2.3. About 44 percent of all social assistance was paid to the poor and was
not in excess of the poverty line; 15 percent was the "spillover", and 41 percent was paid to the
non-poor. 9
Since ITS system relies on more restrictive conditions than the MIG (low income plus
some dysfunctionality-most  commonly  zero  elasticity  of  supply  of  labor),  the numbers  of
potential claimants will be less. This is because fewer people will expect to get social aid and
fewer will apply. Fewer applicants in turn  implies that both the "failure" and  "excess" errors
will be  less frequent,  (not only  in actual numbers,  which  is obvious because the number of
applicants under ITS will be less than under MIG) but in proportion to the applicants. 80 Fewer
number of applicants and less frequent errors will both tend to reduce costs of poverty alleviation
under the ITS system.  Smaller HC will tend to reduce the value in equation (1) through both
channels: lower  "calculated" PD/GDP  (under perfect targeting), and lower error  factor.
7'See World Bank (1994, Chapter 4).
80'Mis  follows from the assumption that the percentage of errors is a function  of the number of potential  claimants. Although
the number of targeting errors (individuals who are wrongly excluded or included) will be the same, with the given number of
applicants, under ITS or  M  IG system, the expected greater number of applicants under the MIG system will raise the expected
proportion of errors under MIG.46
Scrambled incentives. The next problem with the minimum income guarantee has to do
with incentives. If MIG is set at some realistic level,  sufficient for subsistence, then MIG in
transition  economies  will  hardly  be  less  than  the  minimum  wage.  The  ratio  between  the
minimum wage and the effectively used poverty line in transition economies ranges between 1
and  1.6  (see Table  12 below,  and  Krumm,  Milanovic  and  Walton,  1994, p.  16). In  some
countries (Russia, Latvia), the effective minimum wage is about the same (or lower) than the
poverty line.8'  That in turn means that almost all additional earnings of a poor person will be
taxed at the rate of  100 percent (see discussion related to Figure  7 above). The person would
loose one dollar of social assistance for each extra dollar of earnings. Although this is a feature
of all similar systems (that do not have tapering off of benefits), it is particularly grave in this
case because the average tax rate on extra earnings is also close to 100 percent. If the minimum
wage is 4 times the MIG, 82 a person who gets a job  will indeed lose the MIG,  but his average
withdrawal rate will be 25 percent. If the minimum wage and the MIG are the same, his average
tax rate is 100 percent. Incentive to join the labor force instead of remaining dependent on hand-
outs will be low. Further  weakening the incentives will be the fact that leisure is preferred  to
work (so that the same income without work will be positively preferred to income from work).
The  incentive  effect  can  be  formalized.  Consider  two  possible  choices  facing  an
individual. The first is to work informally earning OWm,  where W.  = minimum wage and ,  < 1,
with the probability p  of receiving social assistance aW,m,  (where a < 1) while claiming that his
actual income is zero. His/her  expected income will be:
(3Wm  +  p  (CWm)  =  ((3 +P0)  W
The second choice is to earn the minimum wage W..  Disutility of labor is the same in
both cases. To illustrate, let, for the moment, both ay  and fl be 0.8.  Then for all p > 0.25,  it will
be preferable  to  rely on social assistance.  So long as he/she has more than  1 chance in 4 to
"cheat" the social assistance office,  he would rationally choose to do so.
Clearly, the decision will critically depend on the parameter a.  We can assume that ,B's
will be more or  less the same across  the countries,  i.e.  there  would be  always some,  rather
given, cost  of working informally. But at moves from  1 in poor  countries that would like to
introduce MIG like Russia to 1/5 in rich countries with steep incentives like the UK. In countries
where the minimum wage is at least five times higher than the social assistance benefit, it would
not pay at all to try to  "cheat". Even if probability of success were  1, a person would still be
better off working in the formal sector at the minimum wage than working informally and trying
8 "The  official minimum wage is lower because it is only used as a scalar to determine the wage scales and other benefits.
Hardly anyone (0.2 percent of the employed in October 1994) is paid the minimum wage in Russia ($8). About 4 percent of
workers receive the minimum wage ($25) in Latvia.
8 21n developed economies,  the ratios range between 3 and 8 (see Krumm, Milanovic and Walton,  1994, p.  16).47
to claim social assistance. In countries where  ac= 1/4, like in the US, the chance of success in
cheating should be at least 80 percent.  But in countries,  like Poland and  Russia,  where a  is
between 1/2  and 1, the p need not be greater than 40 and 20 percent respectively for cheating to
pay off.
Compared with MIG,  the ITS  system scores much higher here, simply because social
assistance is given only to those  with zero or  close-to-zero elasticity of  labor supply,  so the
incentive problems are minimized.
Administration.  A final problem with the guaranteed minimum income is the problem
of administration.  As mentioned before,  social assistance offices are likely to be  swamped by
the high number of claimants.  Officers may be unable to deliver the benefits. Or,  an increase
in the number of offices, employees, and thus costs may be needed to deal with the prospective
claimants.
Now,  the problem  of administration  is present in  both MIG  and ITS.  Under ITS,  as
under  MIG,  social workers will need to gauge incomes.  They are not,  however,  required to
make good on the income shortfall below the poverty line (which may save some time). On the
other  hand,  officials  will  probably  have  to  spend  more  time  checking  the  exact  family
circumstances. Time-costs per claimant may be even higher under the ITS variant. But since the
overall number of claimants will be less, the two effects may, in the aggregate, balance off each
other.
In conclusion, ITS system appears preferable in terms of targeting, costs and incentives.
There is no clear difference in terms of administration costs (see Table  11).
Table 11
Summary comparison of Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG)
and Income-testing as Screening (ITS) systems
Objectives  Preferred  system  Why
Targeting  ITS  More  restrictive conditions and
"failure" and  "excess" errors are less.
Costs  ITS  More  restrictive conditions; less
leakage.
Incentives  ITS  Assistance given only to those unable to
work.
Administration  no difference  Case-load heavier under MIG; but time
required per each case greater under
ITS.48
Some essential  rules for transfer payments
The administration  problem common  to both variants suggests  that, whatever  variant is
adopted,  some  simple  rules regarding  the relationship  between  the minimum  wage,  the minimum
pension, the minimum  unemployment  benefit and the poverty line need to exist. The purpose
of these relationships  is to  exclude from the purview of authorities some of  the potential
claimants, and thus diminish the pressure on  social assistance offices. To illustrate: if the
minimum  wage  is higher than the poverty line, then no individual  living by himself and having
a job, is likely to apply for social  aid. His case will be automatically  dismissed.  If this is not the
case, the officials  will have to spend time finding out if his income is or not below the poverty
line.
The poverty line must be set at such a level which will make ineligible for social
assistance:  (1) those who have a job (implying  that the minimum  wage must exceed the poverty
line for a single adult), (2) pensioners (ditto for the minimal or social pension), (3) recipients
of  unemployment benefits. It  must  also  exclude those  who,  in  addition to  the  above
characteristics, have children in  respect of  whom are paid family allowances (FA). 83 This
means  that a standard  family  of four, where  the adults are either employed  at the minimum  wage
or unemployed  or pensioners  and children  receive  family allowance,  must be above the poverty
line. These rules would leave as  potential claimants for  social assistance only the  truly
vulnerable:  those whose unemployment  benefits have expired, whose spouse has no source of
income, who are handicapped  etc.
Written in a formula form, the rules are:
W.  >  UEB.,in  >  SA,
P.,,,  >  SA,
2 UEBB  +  2 FA  >  SA4
P  +  UEBBm  +  2 FA  >  SA4
The first relationship above shows the minimum wage (W.)  must be greater the
minimum  unemployment  benefit (UEB)  and both, of course, greater than the social assistance
line (=effective poverty line) for a single individual  (SA,). The same applies to the minimum
pension (P.).  The last two equations show the relations that must hold for the standard (2
adults, 2 children) household.'
"'3Te role of family allowances or other universal (or quasi-universal, in the case when some rough income-testing is used
to disqualify 'rich'  households) is very important because their existence can substantially cut on the number of social assistance
claimants.
"4Since the minimum wage is already defined as higher than the unemployment benefit, the relations will hold afortiori  for
the minimum wage. We also do not consider because it is unrealistic the family composed of two adults who are both retired
and two children.49
Table 12 documents these relationships using the data from  several transition economies.
For Hungary and Poland, all individual relation are "right":  the minimum wage, the minimum
pension and the minimum unemployment benefit are all greater or equal to the poverty line (in
both countries, the minimum pension is used as the "screening" poverty line). In Estonia,  the
individual relations are also "right" with the exception of unemployment benefit that is less than
the poverty line. In Russia and Latvia, on the contrary,  the poverty line for an adult is several
times greater than either the minimum wage, the minimum pension or the unemployment benefit.
When we look at the situation of a "standard" family only in Hungary does it stay ahead
of poverty regardless of whether its adults members are employed, unemployed or retired.  This
is  due  to  relatively  high  family  allowance. 85 In  Poland  and  Estonia,  however,  a  standard
household would stay ahead of poverty only if both adults are employed. Otherwise, its income
will  be  about  10-20 percent  lower  than  the  poverty  threshold.  In  Latvia  and  Russia,  the
"standard"  household is deeply below the poverty line (and thus can, at least in principle, try
to claim social assistance) whether its members and unemployed, retired or work at low wages.
The poverty lines are set unrealistically high. It clearly does not make sense to have a poverty
line of  $45-$50 per  adult when the minimum wage  is $25 as  in Latvia,  or  about $15 as  in
Russia. In effect,  Latvian government is in the process of revising the poverty line. 86
85The  minimum income requirement for a standard 4-member household is, based on the OECD equivalence scale, assumed
to equal 2.7  adult units.
"rhe  World Bank suggested lowering the current poverty line to about $22 per capita per  month.50
Table  12
Relationship  between the poverty  line,  wages,  pensions,  unemployment  benefits
(in current  dollars,  per  month)
Latvia  Estonia  Russia  Poland  Hungary
end-93  beg. 94  April 94  end-93  Q2/93
Poverty hne per  1 adult  50  22  45  68  72
Minimum pension  21  23  10  68  72
Minimum wage  25  23  15*  92  115
Average wage  83  92  110  240  325
Minimum UEB  18  14  10  74  97
Family alowance  per one child a/  11  9  7  9  32
Income  of the  standard  household  as %
of the poverty  line
Both adults unemployed  41  77  28  90
One unemployed, one retired  44  93  28  87  12;
Both adults employed at minimum wage  52  . 36  1..  .. 1
Notes: Domestic  currency  converted  at current  exchangc  rates.
Cells whcre the poverty  relationships  are satisfied  are  shaded.
a/ Family  allowances  vary in function  of number  of children and their age. An approximate  average  value was chosen in each case.
*  = The effective  minimum  wage in Russia  is higher  than the official  mininum wage of approximately  $10 (see footnote  35 above)51
Section  4
CONCLUSIONS
What do our seven stylized  facts suggest  for the future?
High elasticity of poverty with respect to income was responsible for fast increase in the
number of the poor. Can we expect a symmetrical movement which, accordion-like, after having
pushed people below the poverty line, rises them above as incomes pick up? This depends on
the shape of future growth. If income growth occurs first at the top and in the middle of income
distribution,  inequality will continue to rise and poverty will remain stable. This  seems to have
been the case in  Poland,  the only transition  economy whose real GDP has been growing for
three consecutive years. While GDP in 1994 is 10 percent higher than in 1991 (and real personal
incomes 7 percent higher), the poverty rate in 1994 is about the same as in 1992, and inequality
has risen.
But,  then,  when growth  "trickles down",  there could be sharp declines  in poverty  as
relatively large segments of the population now bunched around the poverty line are pulled up.
How likely is such a scenario? Several elements lend support to this optimistic view. Unlike in
Latin America,  the poor do not represent a distinct "underclass".  Their poverty is "shallow":
the income of an average poor in the transition economies is some 20 percent below the poverty
line;  in  Latin  America,  it  is  40  percent  below  the  same  poverty  line.  The  educational
achievements  of  the  poor  seem  reasonable  and  not  too  different  from  the  rest  of  the
population.'  Their access to  social services, ownership of consumer durables and apartments
is also close to the average."S The declines in their incomes are recent and have not yet been
reflected in  a  marked deterioration  of their  asset  position.  Up to  now,  it looks more like a
transitory  income  shock.  The  key  infrastructure  for  the  resumption  of  nornal  life  (e.g.
reasonable dwellings, school attendance, health care) is still there. If the "trickle down" does not
take too  much time  to  come around,  large  numbers  of the current  poor  could be  pulled  up
relatively quickly. But,  if the  "trickle down" takes a long time,  these favorable elements will
gradually  be  lost.  In  terms  of  durable  goods ownership  and  human  capital,  the poor  may
gradually acquire characteristics different (inferior) from the rest of the population. Growth may
then come too late for them.
One conclusion, and a possible concern,  emerging from the results of the labor market
studies  on Poland,  Hungary,  Czech Republic,  Slovakia and  eastern  Germany,  is  that  what
8 1 In Poland, the household heads of the poor households have, on average, 9.4 years of education, the non-poor, 10.6 years
(the difference of 12 percent).  In Argentina,  the bottom quintile household heads'  average years of education are 6.6 vs.  8.8
for the rest of the population (the difference of 25 percent); in Chile, 6.1 vs. 8.6 (the difference of 30 percent).  (For Argentina,
Chile and other Latin American countries,  see Psacharopoulos et al,  1992, Annex tables).
8&Trying  to "guess" who is poor based on asset-ownership or access to social services fails (see Dupre  1994 on Russia). If
income of the very poor is written as  100, incomes of the "middle poor" and the non-poor in Poland are respectively 109 and
133; letting ownership of consumer durables,  measured by a synthetic indicator, be 100 for the poor,  the values for the "middle
poor" and non-poor are only 106 and 114.52
happens to the unemployed poor will greatly depend on  what happens to the people with
vocational education. Their position, compared to other educational groups, has deteriorated
since the transition  possibly due to their pre-transition  oversupply. 89 The problem  can be solved
in two ways: either there would  be an increase  in demand for their skills or they would  have to
be retrained. The first solution is unlikely because their skills seem to be in low demand in a
market economy. This then puts the onus on retraining. Retraining is expensive. How will
countries that already have grave problems  controlling  social expenditures  succeed  in financing
training is a mystery. One possibility is, of course, proportionate  cuts elsewhere. For unless
something is  done regarding the people with vocational education, a  possibility that an
"underclass"  appear cannot be ruled out.
What will be the outcome of the key tradeoff faced now, that between the elderly and
children?
A reduction  in pension  spending  should  allow for some  increase  in other social transfers,
in particular  for family  allowances  and large poor families, a segment  of the population  the most
affected by negative  aspects of the transition. A shift in transfers, away from the elderly and
towards children can be justified on two grounds.
*Children are now the most vulnerable  group with poverty incidence about 1  /2  times
higher  than country-average  (see Figure 6); the aged are probably  the least vulnerable  as a group
although  there are obvious differences  among them. 90
*Children, who are future citizens  and workers, should be spared as much as possible
the worst pain of the current crisis. This is not purely a social but also an economic  argument
because impairment  at an early age translates into lower education  attainment  and productivity
later in life. If  the countries in transition aspire to  regain growth and become developed
economies,  they will need an educated  and hard working  labor force. None of this would  happen
if children are stunted in their development  at a young  age. 91
8 9This point is made by Flanagan (1993). Vodopivec and Orazem (1994, p.14),  Chase (1995, p.  15), Bird, Schwarze and
Wagner (1992, p.  12), World Bank (1994, p.  92) all find the decline in the position of those with vocational education compared
to people with general secondary or university education.
'Elderly  living alone, particularly women,  have very high poverty rates.
9'An illustration of the severity of the problem is provided by a survey conducted in ten  largest cities in Russia: almost 50
percent of children report being hungry at least from time to time and one child in eight misses either breakfast or dinner (see
Rimashevskaya, 1993, p.  47).53
Figure 6
Age and relative poverty  rates
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Source: Milanovic (1994).
The real key issue is not whether this change is desirable but whether the shift in
priorities, from the elderly towards children, is politically  feasible. It is a very difficult  change
because the elders are a very powerful and vocal political group. The same problem is on the
agenda  in the developed  economies  as well. Modest success  it has met so far does not bode well
for the reforms in transition  economies.  In addition, the transition economies  need to effect  this
major realignment  in conditions where some of them are barely starting to emerge from the
depression  with levels of income 15 to 20 percent below those  of 10 years ago, while others are
still mired in depression.54
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